A Systems Development Life Cycle study of the Information Center. by McCaffrey, Martin J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1985-09
The feasibility of implementing an expert system for
aircraft maintenance discrepancy scheduling with











THE FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING AN EXPERT
SYSTEM FOR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE








Thesis Co-Advisors: N.R. Lyons
D.R. Dolk




SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Data Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
1. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO
READ INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)
The Feasibility of Implementing an Exper
System for Aircraft Maintenance Dis-
crepancy Scheduling with the Naval
5. TYPE OF REPORT A PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis
September 1985
6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORS 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER'ij
Martin J. McCaffrey
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5100
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT. TASK
AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS




September 19 8 5
13. NUMBER OF PAGES
127




16. DISTRIBUTION ST ATEMEN T (of this Report)
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the ebetract entered In Block 20, If different from Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse aide II necessary and Identify by block number)
Expert Systems; Knowledge-Based Systems; NALCOMIS;
Aviation Maintenance Scheduling; Knowledge Acquisition;
NALDA; Heuristic
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse aide II necesaary and Identity by block number)
The feasibility of developing an expert system to support
the scheduling of discrepancies in Maintenance Control is
examined. A general review of expert systems and NALCOMIS
is presented. An in-depth analysis of the scheduling and
planning process is made. This analysis is based on interviews
with several experts. The ability of NALCOMIS to support an
DD 1 jAN^S 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S N 0102- LF- 014- 6601 1
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered'
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PACE (Whan Datm Ent«r«<0
#4 - TITLE - CONTINUED
Aviation Logistics Command Management Information
System (NALCOMIS)
#19 - ABSTRACT - CONTINUED
expert system and discussion on whether such a system
is warranted for this problem domain conclude the
thesis.
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(TTh«n Dmim Enl»r»d)
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
The Feasibility of Implementing an Expert System
for Aircraft Maintenance Discrepancy Scheduling
with the Naval Aviation Logistics Command
Management Information System (NALCOMIS)
by
Martin J. McCaffrey
Major, United States Marine Corps
B.A., California State University, Fullerton, 1978
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






The feasibility of developing an expert system to sup-
port the scheduling of discrepancies in Maintenance Control
is examined. A general review of expert systems and
NALCOMIS is presented. An in-depth analysis of the schedul-
ing and planning process is made. This analysis is based on
interviews with several experts. The ability of NALCOMIS
to support an expert system and discussion on whether such




II. KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS 13
A. CATEGORIES OF KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS 15
B. STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT 17
C. COMPONENTS 17
1. Knowledge Base 20
2. Inference Engine 24
3. Natural Language 28
D. EXPERT SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE 29
1. Problem Identification Stage 31
2. Conceptualization Stage 35
3. Implementing A Prototype 35
4. Testing
5. Revision and Expansion of the Prototype -- 40
6. Integration and Maintenance 42
E. DEVELOPMENT LANGUAGES AND TOOLS 44
1. Languages 44
2. Development Tools 47
F. SHORTCOMINGS 48
G. CONCLUDING REMARKS
III. MAINTENANCE CONTROL AND DISCREPANCY SCHEDULING 52
A. AIRCRAFT READINESS REPORTING TERMS 54
1. Mission Capable
a. Full Mission Capable
5
54
b. Partial Mission Capable 55
2. Not Mission Capable 55
a. Not Mission Capable Maintenance 55
b. Not Mission Capable Supply 55
B. MAINTENANCE/MATERIAL CONTROL 56
C. DISCREPANCY SCHEDULING 61
1. Decision Environment 63
2. Priorities 66
a. Flight Schedule Commitments 66
b. Downing Discrepancies 67
c. Up Discrepancies 68
d. Scheduled Maintenance/High Time
Components 70
e. Other Considerations 72
3. Constraints 74
a. Hangar Space 75
b. IMRL 75
c. PME/Test Equipment 75
d. GSE 76
e. Personnel 76
f. Type of Discrepancy 77
g. Local Constraints 77
h. Support 78
4. Knowledge Base 78
a. General Prioritization Heuristics 79
b. Aircraft Systems Knowledge 79
c. Parts Availability 81
d. Personnel Capabilities 82
5. Conclusions/Comments 82
a. Complexity of the Decision Process 82






1. Honeywell Software 91
2. Application Software 92
E. EXPANDABILITY 93
V. A KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR THE MAINTENANCE
SCHEDULING DOMAIN 94
A. PLANNING/SCHEDULING DOMAINS 94
B. KNOWLEDGE FROM THE PRESENT DATA BASE 9 5
1. Aircraft Facts 96
2. Other Facts 97
C. KNOWLEDGE BASE 97
1. Facts 97
2. Heuristics 101
D. KNOWLEDGE FROM USER QUERY 102
E. KNOWLEDGE NOT CONSIDERED 104
1. Personnel 104
2. Common Sense Maintenance Knowledge 105
VI. FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS 107
A. EXPERT SYSTEM APPLICABILITY TO
MAINTENANCE SCHEDULING • 107
1. Suitability of the Problem Domain 107
2. Benefits from Developing an Expert
System 109
3. Drawbacks 111
B. NALCOMIS CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT AN EXPERT
SYSTEM 111
C. IS DEVELOPMENT OF AN EXPERT SYSTEM
JUSTIFIED? 114
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 119
LIST OF REFERENCES 123
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 126
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 Steps in Building an Expert System 18
2.2 Expert System Components 19
2.3 Knowledge Representation Schemes 22
2.4 Stages in an Expert System Development Life
Cycle 45
3.1 0-Level Maintenance Department Organization 53
3.2 Major Responsibilities and Software 60
4.1 NALCOMIS -Hardware and Software 90
5.1 Discrepancy Scheduling Rules 103
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary goal of Naval aviation maintenance is to
provide the required mission capable aircraft to meet its
squadron's commitments. To do this it seeks to maximize
aircraft operational readiness. The Maintenance Control
Officer, in prioritizing and assigning all work assignments,
has a significant impact on this objective.
Maintenance control is one of the most demanding, com-
plex, and mentally stressful work environments in the mili-
tary today. It is the focal point where all support and
information assets converge in a squadron.
It is the objective of the Maintenance Control Officer
to optimize the use of available manpower and material re-
sources in seeking maximum aircraft operational readiness.
Optimum assignments and decisions require efficient processing
of all available information. Major responsibility for
meeting aircraft availability requirements to fill operational
flight assignments rests here.
Decisions are made under extremely demanding and time
sensitive conditions. Turnover of key personnel is relatively
high compared to comparable civilian environments. Con-
straints restrict the decision making in this environment.
Also, some question exists as to the ability of the decision
makers to synthesize adequately all the information for
effective decision making.
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Development of expert or knowledge-based systems has
rapidly expanded in the past few years. Such systems are
knowledge-intensive programs which solve problems requir-
ing human expertise. Developed applications include such
areas as diagnosis, interpretation, and scheduling. It
may be possible for such a system to provide decision sup-
port for job planning and scheduling in aviation maintenance
control.
With the implementation of the Naval Air Logistics Com-
mand Management Information System (NALCOMIS) , considerable
computer resources will become available to every squadron
in Naval aviation. The present configuration at the squadron
level includes a Honeywell DPS 6/54 minicomputer with one
megabyte of memory and three Winchester 52 megabyte disk
drives. NALCOMIS provides a real-time management information
system for aviation maintenance. No provision is currently
made, however, to provide any enhanced decision support
capability with the system.
Because of the possible benefits an expert system offers
for improving the decision making effectiveness in this
area, and the potentially improved operational readiness
that would result, an investigation of the feasibility of
applying this technology to the scheduling of work assignments
is warranted. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the
feasibility of employing an expert system for scheduling and
prioritizing aircraft maintenance work assignments and to
11
consider the implementation of such a system using NALCOMIS
assets.
Chapter II provides an overview of current expert system
technology and practice. The elements, components, and
theory behind such systems are discussed. Chapter III de-
tails the functions and structure of an organizational level
maintenance department and provides information on the
responsibilities and activities of the maintenance control
officer and of maintenance control. It also provides an
in-depth examination of the decision scheduling process.
This information is the result of interviews with several
experienced and "expert" maintenance control personnel.
The knowledge requirements, constraints, and environmental
factors are analyzed.
A comprehensive historical and technical discussion on
NALCOMIS is included in Chapter IV. This material is
oriented to the hardware and software currently implemented
in the organizational level prototype system. Chapter V
presents the knowledge base requirements for an expert sys-
tem used in prioritizing aircraft discrepancy assignments.
Available resources and needs are addressed. Chapter VI
analyzes the feasibility of developing an expert system
and NALCOMIS' s ability to support such a system. Chapter
VII summarizes the research and makes several recommendations
based on the analysis.
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II. KNOWLEDGE -BASED SYSTEMS
This chapter serves as an introduction to expert sys-
tems, or knowledge-based systems as they are sometimes called
Its purpose is to describe the concepts and basic elements
of which a knowledged-based system is composed. General
information, categories, stages in development, basic con-
cepts, and components of these systems will be covered. Also
discussed are knowledge representation, knowledge acquisi-
tion, and the benefits and shortcomings of these systems.
What is an expert or knowledge-based system? Weiss and
Kulikowski [Ref. l:p. 1] define an expert system as one that:
. . . handles real-world, complex problems requiring an
expert's interpretation.
. . . Solves these problems using a computer model of
expert human reasoning, reaching the same conclusions
that the human expert would reach if faced with a
comparable problem.
Another definition is offered by Professor Edward
Feigenbaum [Ref. 2:p. 5], a leading researcher in the field
of artificial intelligence (AI)
:
. . . an intelligent computer program that uses knowledge
and inference procedures to solve problems that are
difficult enough to require significant human expertise
for a solution.
Feigenbaum goes on to state that facts and heuristics make
up the knowledge of an expert. "Facts" are public informa-
tion generally agreed upon by experts in a field. "Heuris-
tics" are rules of good judgment. Others often refer to
13
heuristics as "rules of thumb." Heuristics are not always
widely known in a given domain and may vary from one expert
to another.
For the past fifteen years, research scientists have
been working intensely on projects in which they use domain
specific knowledge as the basis for solving problems [Ref. 3:
p. 264]. This is a different approach from earlier research
which tried to program general problem solving strategies and
failed [Ref. 4]. As a result, laboratory knowledge systems
have demonstrated the ability to solve complex problems in
scientific, medical, educational, business, and military
applications
.
In the past few years, some of these systems have found
their way into the civilian market place. One of the first
successful experimental systems was MYCIN. It diagnosed
certain infectious blood diseases and recommended appropriate
treatment. There are several commercial products based on
MYCIN technology [Ref. 5] . Rl , which is now known as XCON,
is an expert system which configures Digital Equipment
Corporation computer systems [Ref. 6]. Another system,
Prospector, is used in geological evaluation of mineral
deposits and has discovered deposits worth much more than
its development costs [Ref. 7]. Stanford University, MIT,
and Carnegie Mellon University have led research efforts
in the area of expert systems research.
Barr and Feigenbaum have coined the term "knowledge
engineering" to describe the field of AI involved with
14





The researchers who develop knowledge systems
are called knowledge engineers.
A. CATEGORIES OF KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS
Researchers have classified knowledge systems applica-
tions into several types or categories. Diagnostic systems
deduce system malfunctions from observations. This category
is the most prevalent of expert systems currently developed.
Medical and electronic diagnostic systems have been fully
developed and a majority of the commercially viable expert
system tools have sprung from this type of system. MYCIN is
the best known example of a diagnostic system.
Another type of system deals with prediction. Many of
the same knowledge representations and control strategies
that are used in diagnostic systems are applicable to this
category. Prediction systems try to determine the consequences
from a given set of facts and situation. Military and weather
forecasting are two applications of this type of system.
Satisfying the constraints of a problem with a proper
configuration falls under the design system category. Hayes-
Roth states that such systems verify that a configuration,
determined by a relationship of objects, meets the given con-
straints [Ref. 9]. Circuit design and budgeting are two
areas that come under this category. Planning is considered
a subgroup of the design problem. A planning system seeks
15
to deduce actions and their effects. Automatic programming,
project, and military planning are examples of planning
system applications.
Interpretation systems attempt to infer a situation des-
cription from observed facts. Intelligence analysis and
chemical structure analysis are areas in which this type of
system has been applied.
Several other categories have been established; however,
no systems for these categories have gone past the laboratory
development stage. Monitoring, debugging, instruction,
repair, and control systems all fit this status. Extensive
research work is being done in each of these categories. The
potential benefits of an expert system monitoring the sys-
tems in a nuclear power plant or providing air traffic
control have tremendous potential benefits.
Later discussion will cover knowledge representation and
control schemes as well as development tools for knowledge
systems. It should be mentioned that the type of problem to
be solved should be matched with the most efficient techniques
for developing that category of knowledge system.
This thesis is evaluating the feasibility of developing
an expert system for scheduling aircraft maintenance dis-
crepancies. This falls under the planning category mentioned
earlier.
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B. STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT
After many years of research, an iterative development
process has emerged as the prevalent method for knowledge
system construction. The following is a general summary of
this iterative process. After determining that a problem can
be reduced to a workable domain, an expert source of knowledge
must be found. Initial interviews are conducted and a
knowledge representation scheme is chosen. Reasoning strate-
gies are then selected. The next step is to build a proto-
type. The prototype is then tested on cases developed by
the expert. Modifications, and perhaps expansion, are made
to the prototype, as necessary. This iterative process will
be continued until the prototype produces what is considered
expert status for the test cases. The prototype is then
tested against actual field cases. Additional modifications






Before one can hope to understand how an expert system
is built, it is first necessary to have a knowledge of the
major components that comprise such a system. Several com-
ponents combine to form a generic knowledge system: the
knowledge base, the inference engine, and the natural language
user interface. Figure 2.2 is a diagram of the major com-
ponents. Other elements to consider when building a knowl-
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Figure 2.2 Expert System Component
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knowledge acquisition, and explanation subsystems. Each of
these elements will be covered in the paragraphs which follow.
1 . Knowledge Base
This part of the system contains the experts 1 facts
and heuristic rules that apply to the given problem domain.
The way facts and relationships are encoded is known as
knowledge representation. Knowledge representation is the
major difference between knowledged-based systems and standard
algorithmic programs. Knowledge representation is the key
issue in how systems are built and how they perform. There
are several methods of representing knowledge. In this sec-
tion an overview of how this knowledge is represented is
discussed.
The first representational scheme to be discussed is
the semantic network. A semantic network uses nodes and
links to represent abstract relations among objects in a
knowledge base. An object, which may be either a physical or
conceptual entity, is represented by a node. Elementary
objects may be represented by alphanumeric characters called
"atomic symbols." Nodes may also represent descriptors
which provide information about objects. Links represent
relationships between objects and descriptors. Two widely
used links are isa and hasa , through which a graphic taxonomy
is possible. Heuristic knowledge and definitional informa-
tion are also provided by other links. The ability of nodes
to inherit the characteristics of other related nodes in
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their hierarchy, and the flexibility of this representational
method, are its major advantages. Figure 2.3a is a simple
semantic network representation.
A derivative of the semantic network is the object-
attribute-value representation (O-A-V) . As with semantic
networks, objects are either physical or conceptual enti-
ties. Attributes are characteristics of objects, and value
refers to the value of an attribute at a specific time
(Figure 2.3.b). The only link relationships used are isa
and hasa . These links join the object to the attribute and
the attribute to the value, respectively. In the O-A-V
representation scheme objects may be related, certainty
factors may be used to indicate degrees of uncertainty.
Trees are used to designate the order and relationship of
objects [Ref. 2:p. 40].
A third method of representing knowledge is by
using rules (Figure 2.3.c). This has been the dominant form
of symbolic knowledge representation in first generation
knowledge systems. A rule has a premise (the if clause)
and a conclusion (the then clause) . Logical connectives
"AND" and "OR" are used to connect several clauses in a
premise or a conclusion. Rules may vary from simple to
complex. Uncertainty and variability may also be expressed.
Rules are widely used for representing procedural
knowledge or methods of accomplishing goals. In solving
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d. Frame Representation for the Concept of a Book
Figure 2.3 Knowledge Representation Schemes
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exists. Using a rules scheme has the advantage of simpli-
fying the generation of system prompts. A rule predicate
is easily turned into a question. Likewise, explanation
generation is also simplified.
Another way to represent knowledge in a knowledge
base is by using frames [Ref. 10:pp. 73-77]. This represen-
tation is essentially a semantic network in which a frame
is a description of an object that in turn provides slots
for storing values associated with the object. Facts may
be stated/stored by procedural or declarative representations
Slots may also include rules or default values about an
object. Objects may inherit the attributes of more abstract
objects. The primary advantage of frame representation is
its ability to concisely store a great amount of knowledge
about object properties and relations. Figure 2.3.d shows
a frame representation.
The final representation method presently used in
a knowledge base is logic-based. This method has many
similarities to rule-based systems. First order predicate
calculus is a formal way of representing logical propositions
and the relationships between propositions. A predicate is
a statement about an object or objects. A statement has
a value of either true or false and can be linked into more
complex expressions with connectives. Facts may be derived
by applying basic rules of logic to the expressions. A
primary advantage of logic representation is its ability to
23
represent almost any type of knowledge explicitly. Reference
11 provides a straightforward and detailed discussion on
this representation.
Although early knowledge systems used only one of
the previously discussed schemes for representing knowledge,
more recent systems often use a combination of representa-
tions. Each method is used for the knowledge it represents
best.
2 . Inference Engine
This component embodies the control and inference
strategies that experts apply when they manipulate the rules
and facts stored in the knowledge base. It serves as the
general reasoning mechanism and rule interpreter of the sys-
tem. Two major jobs are performed by this component. If
possible, it determines new facts by examining the facts and
rules that exist at a given time. Secondly, it also decides
the order .of inferences. An inference is the process of
deriving new facts from already known facts
.
There are three inference strategies used in current
rule and logic-based expert systems. The rule of logic
commonly referred to as modus ponens is the most widely used
strategy. It allows one to determine new facts from rules
and known facts. In general this law states that if the
premise of a rule is true, the conclusion may be assumed to
be true, i.e., if A, then B.
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A second inference strategy allows for the use of
uncertain information in both facts and rules. Certainty
factors are usee by the inference engine for expressing
indefinite or uncertain information.
Resolution is the third strategy and is a rather
complex logical process. It basically condenses to the
following: IF-THEN statements may be written as OR state-
ments, and OR statements may be combined. Under appro-
priate circumstances, the inference engine uses this
strategy in addition to modus ponens . See Reference 2
,
pp. 52-54 for more information.
In the present state of knowledge system development,
these are the three basic inference strategies used. Al-
though other strategies exist, they have not yet made it
from the research laboratories to commercially available
systems
.
A knowledge system must have some way of determining
where to begin the reasoning process, e.g., which rule to
look at first. Secondly, there must be some way of resolving
a situation where alternative lines of reasoning occur.
Control mechanisms serve to satisfy these two requirements.
Two primary reasoning mechanisms are employed in
present control techniques. These procedures are commonly
referred to as backward chaining and forward chaining. The
representation of the knowledge base is often the determining
factor as to which of these implementations is used. When a
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problem is being studied, the conceptual area defined by
all the possible states that could occur as a result of
interactions between the elements and operators is called
the search space [Ref. 2:p. 55]. The shape of the search
space, i.e., whether all the possible goals are known,
frequently determines which method is more efficient. If
the goal(s) state is not known forward chaining is used.
Backward inferencing occurs when the system works
backward from a hypothetical solution or goal to determine
evidence supporting the solution. Intermediate hypotheses
are often formulated and tested during this process. A
search of the knowledge base first centers on a rule or rules
whose firing would give the desired conclusion [Ref. 12].
The premise, or antecedent part of the rule, will then focus
on the problem facts stored in working memory. When this
search finds a match with the antecedent rule the search is
complete. If a search fails, the system will continue the
search for another rule whose firing satisfies the first rule.
This process continues until either a rule is found to satisfy
the initial antecedent or the system asks for information
from the user in an attempt to satisfy the rule. This type
of inferencing is most effective when the possible outcomes
are known and relatively small in numbers. It is the primary
control strategy used in MYCIN [Ref. 13:p. 5].
Forward inferencing attempts to reason forward
from the facts to a solution. This control technique is
26
data driven and is a more complex process than backward
chaining.
A workarea is an area of memory set aside for storing
a description of a problem constructed by the system from the
facts supplied by the user or inferred from the knowledge
base. This area is also called working memory. It contains
the known facts. Forward chaining proceeds by first recog-
nizing the rules that are satisfied based on the contents of
working memory. The conclusions of such rules are then
placed in the workarea. The system then checks additional
rules, trying to determine which can succeed.
Other processes are also used by the inference engine
for the purpose of control. Depth-first search of the
knowledge base seeks to produce subgoals and pursues these
goals until all information on them has been obtained. It
seems to be the preferred method. Breadth-first search will
first look at all the premises in a rule. This type of
process may appear to be disjointed, especially if the user
is asked for input. King and Harmon use an analogy that
general problem solvers tend to use breadth-first reasoning
because they inquire in a general way about the problem to
be solved [Ref. 2:pp. 57-58]. On the other hand, a specialist
problem solver concentrates on a specific aspect of the
problem and looks for the details associated with one aspect
at a time. A depth-first method is more appropriate in this
case.
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Monotonic and nonmonotonic reasoning are two other
aspects often associated with the inference engine. With
monotonic reasoning, all values for an attribute (a general
characteristic or property of a physical entity) remain the
same for the entire problem solving session. Thus the amount
of true information continually grows. This type of reason-
ing is predominant in present systems.
Nonmonotonic reasoning allows facts that have initially
true values to be changed. This is a very complex process
to deal with in a computer environment. Planning is an
example of one area where this type of reasoning may be used.
Decisions which were originally believed to be true may
be later retracted as additional information is determined.
This concludes discussion of inference engines and
the control procedures associated with them. They are the
state of the art and are being used in most of today's
knowledge systems. More efficient methods of reasoning and
search are still being sought, however, this is one reason
why expert systems today are still restricted to specific
problem domains and have not reached the capabilities of
reproducing the broader knowledge and reasoning abilities
of even a small child.
3 . Natural Language
As this subject constitutes a major branch of AI
research (as do expert systems) , only a brief discussion
dealing with the role of Natural Language in expert systems
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will be made. Natural Language is basically a method that
allows conventional language inputs to the computer system.
Natural Language is usually introduced as a feature of a
development tool. Its primary use in knowledge systems is
to provide an interface for the user in developing knowledge
bases. It must be stressed that these conventional language
inputs are not to the stage of development that any semantic
input is acceptable. Rather, a structured and somewhat
constrained English language input and output is used. The
use of Natural Language has proven quite beneficial in
building knowledge bases using knowledge development tools.
D. EXPERT SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE
The term "knowledge acquisition" refers to the process
used by a knowledge engineer of extracting knowledge from an
expert source and programming it in the knowledge system.
Human experts are not the only sources of knowledge. Text-
books, empirical data, databases, and other human non-experts
are examples of other potential sources of knowledge.
Knowledge acquisition is an extremely complex and somewhat
ill-structured process that involves problem definition,
implementation, and refinement, in addition to the represen-
tation of the expert's facts and relations in the knowledge
base. Highly detailed and refined domain-specific knowledge
is required to solve a difficult knowledge acquisition prob-
lem. One should remember that building expert systems is not
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a well defined and understood development process. Only
theoretical work has been done in some areas. However, the
research completed over the last ten to fifteen years has
provided a general sequence of stages that occur for most
developments
.
Locating, collecting, and refining knowledge are all part
of the knowledge acquisition process. The gathered knowledge
must be converted to an acceptable computer programming
form. The knowledge acquisition process envelops all the
stages to be discussed, i.e., it is not restricted to only
one or two stages. Throughout the acquisition life cycle
the knowledge engineer attempts to determine the procedures,
specific facts, and judgmental rules of a domain that an
expert uses to solve a problem.
Knowledge acquisition is the bottleneck in building
expert systems [Ref. 14:p. 129J . Because knowledge acquisi-
tion has proven to be such an arduous and intricate proce-
dure, few detailed accounts of the process have been written.
The most cogent and specific coverage to be found was by
Buchanan et al. , in Hayes-Roth's Building Expert Systems
[Ref. 14]. The reader should turn there for a more detailed
account of the knowledge acquisition process.
As with other software development efforts, building an
expert system lends itself to being an iterative process
and knowledge engineers have divided it into several major
stages. These stages need not proceed in the exact order
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presented here. In fact, some of these stages will often
be repeated several times during the development life cycle.
The following is only a logical presentation of the stages.
1. Problem Identification Stage
One of the first steps in project development is to
determine who will be the key players in the development
of the expert system and what roles each will play. A
project may involve one or more knowledge engineers. Although
more than one expert can be chosen, this is not normally the
case. The task of extracting the basic relations, concepts,
and definitions related to the problem is quite difficult.
The knowledge engineer must structure an expert's knowledge
and help the expert to identify and formalize domain concepts
[Ref. 14:p. 165]. This is a formidable task when only one
expert is involved. Experience has shown that involvement
of two or more experts intensifies the problems, since it
is unlikely that two experts would be in total agreement
on how to solve a problem. Trying to choose between differ-
ing views in the early development stages unduly compli-
cates the problem and should be avoided. It has become
standard practice to choose one expert to work with initially.
Later in the development, other experts may be included to
test and revise a newly developed system.
Knowledge engineers must first totally immerse
themselves in a project, learning as much as possible about
the problem and its domain. Ways of becoming more familiar
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with a problem include studying readings and reports on
the subject, talking to people knowledgeable in the field,
or by visiting the site of the problem to be solved and
observing, first hand, present procedures being used.
After this initial research, the knowledge engineer
must determine if the problem is suitable for knowledge
system application. This is one of the most critical points
in the development cycle. Knowledge that is subjective,
symbolic, changing or in part judgmental, is appropriate
for expert system development. Knowledge that is stable,
numerical, formalized, or firm is probably better imple-
mented as a traditional algorithmic program.
If a problem proves suitable to knowledge system
development, the knowledge engineer must begin considering
the general type of task this problem falls under (i.e.,
monitoring, diagnosing, etc.), based on the initial informa-
tion he has acquired. At this point, appropriate methods
of representation and control must be considered.
During this stage an expert must be picked to work
on the development project. In some situations there may be
only one expert in the organization to consider. In others
the search and selection process will be more difficult. By
talking to others in the field, the knowledge engineer should
be able to narrow the search process to a person whose
performance and reputation in the problem domain clearly
exceeds others—an expert.
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Simply finding an expert candidate however, does not
necessarily end the task. If a person is an expert in a
given field, the firm may be reluctant to lose his expertise
for the period of time necessary to fully develop an expert
system--up to two years in some cases. If the system is to
have a good chance of performing at a high level of expertise,
however, the company must be convinced of the necessity of
doing without this highly valued asset. Any less commitment
on the part of management is certain to decrease the chances
of producing a reliable system. Support for this issue is
essential
.
Another issue to be considered is the ability of the
knowledge engineer and the expert to communicate with one
another. These individuals will be working in a very com-
plex environment for a lengthy period of time. Each must
have confidence in the other's ability and be able to get
along with the other. If this area is a troublesome one,
consideration should be given to replacing either the
knowledge engineer or the expert.
Having chosen the two key participants, the problem
then needs to be fully defined. Problem characteristics
and subproblems need to be determined. The terms, avail-
able data, and their relations must also be defined. Con-
sideration should be given to what a solution to the problem
contains. The present role of the expert in solving the
problem should be evaluated. Also, the key concepts related
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to the problem should be developed and clarified.
Buchanan classifies knowledge into two sets, strate-
gic knowledge and structural knowledge [Ref. 14 :p. 134].
Structural knowledge specifies the terms and tasks the user
is determining; strategic knowledge provides how and when
the system will establish these terms and tasks. He indi-
cates these two types of knowledge are joined to what he
terms the system's inference structure. This, or a similar
organizational approach, is appropriate for development.
Another consideration during the problem identification
stage is to determine the personnel, computing, and monetary
requirements necessary to develop the knowledge system. The
two primary personnel required for the project are the
knowledge engineer and the problem expert. As mentioned
previously, considerable time requirements for these players
must be allowed. Development of a knowledge system may
necessitate the dedication of considerable computer time and
assets or even the acquisition of a separate computer environ-
ment. Procurement of a software development tool may also
be required. All these costs need to be considered in this
initial stage of development.
From the information determined in defining the
problem, the goals or objectives of the system must be
identified. Also any constraints to the project should be
agreed on.
From the material presented thus far, it is easy to
see the importance and complexity of this first stage in
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developing a project. Hard, cold facts and issues need to
be completely evaluated during this stage if an efficient




The conceptualization stage consists of a detailed
determination of the concepts of the problem and their re-
lationships. Relationships between objects are stated. The
processes involved in the problem solving and any constraints
are settled. During this stage an attempt is made to separate
and identify the knowledge needed for solving a problem from
the knowledge used to justify a solution. At some point
the concepts and relations should be written down and formalized
At this stage in the development cycle the knowledge engineer
and the expert continue to have a close working relationship.
The knowledge engineer will also continue thinking about
which architectures are best suited to organizing the gathered
knowledge, as well as appropriate tools that may be useful
for representation. A primary goal of this stage is to
reach the point where work on an initial prototype system
can begin.
3 Implementing A Prototype
This stage consists of much more than prototype con-
struction. Initially, the conceptual information is taken
and put in a representative form that can be used with a
chosen implementation tool. The initial prototype should not
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attempt to encompass the entire problem domain, but rather
only a limited but representative problem segment.
Selecting which tool to use will be greatly influenced
by the inference strategies and knowledge employed by the
expert in the process of solving a problem. Seldom is one
tool advantageous in all areas. The tool with minimum dis-
advantages and a representational framework most applicable
to the major areas of the problem is chosen. Harmon and
King advocate that a primary conclusion of the prototyping
be the adequacy of the selected expert system building tool
for expressing the expert's knowledge and heuristics
[Ref . 2:pp. 202-203]
.
In formalizing the problem, constructing a model of
the problem solving process can be an important factor in
development of a prototype system. Model types can be either
mathematical or behavioral [Ref. 14:p. 145]. The role and
characterization of data should also be carefully analyzed.
Included are such considerations as the uncertainty, relia-
bility, and consistency of the data. Partial specification
of such information has proven very beneficial in previous
development processes.
During this phase the knowledge engineer works closely
with the expert, not only to extract the essence of the
problem solving method and heuristics, but also to teach the
expert how to formulate his views in rule forms. The knowl-
edge engineer may possibly demonstrate how he converts the
36
expert's reasoning processes into rules of thumb to be used
in the system. The expert will also be asked to formulate
several test cases which may be used to test a broad range
of system requirements. Typical elements to test include
inference rules, control strategies and input/output out-
comes. For instance, inference rules must be evaluated
for correctness, consistency, and completeness. Test
cases should be designed to test a broad range of require-
ments. Just as the prototype addresses only a subproblem
of the domain, so a test case may be designed to test only
specific aspects of a system.
The prototype system should include the data struc-
tures, inference strategies, and control techniques in a
representational form expected to be used for total system
development. Nevertheless, most authorities make a point
of emphasizing that the initial prototype program should be
designed from the standpoint that the entire program, or
most of it, will be discarded and not used in the final
product. The primary purpose of prototyping is to test the
basic concepts, formalisms, and inference strategies the
knowledge engineer has thus far developed, as well as test
the design tool being used.
4 . Testing
This step in the development cycle seeks to evaluate
the accuracy and utility of the knowledge-based system.
Testing should provide developers with the limitations of
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the expertise of a system. A major goal of testing is
to improve the design and performance of the expert system.
Just as expert system technology is still developing, so
are the methods of evaluating these systems. Testing as a
methodology is rather primitive at this time. Nevertheless,
many lessons in system evaluation have been learned and
the fact that a state of the art has not yet been reached
should not lessen the effort devoted to planned testing
throughout the development stages.
Testing should be an integral part of the development
process. Ideally, system evaluations should be first formu-
lated when the system is being designed and should be con-
ducted throughout the various stages of implementation.
Unfortunately, this is frequently not the case. Gaschnig
contends that planning tests early in development forces
designers to determine specific system goals and objective
measures for the achievement of those goals [Ref. 15:p. 243].
The formality and complexity of tests increases as
system development progresses. The first testing is normally
made after the initial prototype has successfully run the
first couple of test cases and is initially an informal
process. It concludes with formal structured evaluations
of performance and user acceptability of the complete expert
system.
Testing attempts to evaluate the functionality and
accuracy of the knowledge base and inference structure. It
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is much more than simply running test cases and comparing the
results to those of the expert. For example, not only the
fact that the right answer was derived, but the reason the
system produced the right answer will be looked at. Typical
characteristics of the knowledge system that are evaluated
include the reliability of decisions and advice, correct
reasoning, user requirements, ease of use, and input/output
parameters. Program efficiency and the hardware environment
should also be evaluated by testing.
When designing a test, a builder should keep in
mind three key considerations: who it is for; what is to
be evaluated; and the goals of the testing [Ref. 15:pp. 251-
258] . An attempt to involve the user in the testing at an
appropriate stage may pay considerable dividends to developers
by giving early feedback on the user's likes or dislikes.
User interface is normally not a primary concern during
development of the initial prototype. Another benefit comes
from the generation of user interest in a system and a feeling
that user opinions are important to system development. This
may lead to easier acceptance for the system when it is
eventually introduced into the work environment.
Test cases that have successfully proven the capa-
bility of the system at one stage of development and that
have themselves proven to be valid tests, should be repeated
in each later test stage. This ensures that any additions
or modifications to fix a problem have not caused new
problems in areas formerly functioning properly.
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Although the difficulty of designing effective
evaluation criteria is apparent, this fact should not deter
development of testing planning at an early stage. Testing
plays a crucial role in the determination of the ultimate
success of any knowledge system— its acceptance and use by
the user..
5. Revision and Expansion of the Prototype
Although revision and expansion are listed together,
they are, in fact, separate activities. Based on results
of testing, the prototype and its successors are revised
to meet the predetermined requirements. Facts and rules
are revised as necessary. The development tool also is
evaluated for its ability to provide the proper development
environment during prototype implementation and testing.
If the tool proves unsatisfactory, a new tool is selected
and a new prototype built and tested.
Once the prototype is accurately functioning and
has demonstrated the applicability of an expert system to
the problem domain, work is begun on revising the prototype
and developing a complete system. From the prototype, much
insight is gained on the problem solving process and ways
of representing the related knowledge and facts.
Because of basic design revisions, changes in facts,
rules, and different hierarchial relationships, it is not
unusual to discard the prototype and build the complete
system from scratch using the lessons learned in the
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prototype development. Recycling through the implementation
and testing stages is common as the system is refined.
Development of the full expert system provides an
expansion of the knowledge base in both depth and breadth.
Considerable expansion and refinement of the heuristic rules
are required. Not only are new rules added for covering
other problems not originally represented by the prototype,
but a finer, more in-depth knowledge in subproblem areas is
included in the expanded system.
It is at this stage in the development cycle that
intense effort is devoted to designing an expert system
that interacts well with the user. A unique feature of
expert systems is the explanation facility which is able to
explain why it is seeking information or the basis of how it
arrived at a decision. For these features to be useful to
the user they must be easily accessible and concisely ex-
plain an action in English. This requires extensive effort
on the part of the knowledge engineer and the expert during
the design and programming of the system.
Revision, reimplementation, and testing continue
until the knowledge engineer and expert agree the system is
performing at an expert level. One final consideration is
a decision on whether to use the system as developed in the
unique knowledge engineering-based language or to convert
the system to a more common application language for porta-
bility and integration with current hardware or databases.
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At this point integration into the work environment is the
next step.
6 . Integration and Maintenance
This stage is another that is no less important than
any of the others previously covered. No matter how good a
knowledge system may be in giving correct answers and pro-
viding good advice, if it fails to gain acceptance by the
user, it fails.
All the problems normally associated with introduc-
ing any new system into the workplace can be expected. The
politics of orchestrating a major organizational change are
bound to arise and must be dealt with. The knowledge engineer
must attempt to foretell and take action to minimize such
conflicts
.
To overcome resistance to change, several things may
be done. Prior planning that involves dissemination of
information on the forthcoming system, opportunities for
communications for those to be involved with the new system
(both before and after introduction) , and proper support for
the new system are but a few. Extensive training for all
involved with the system is also necessary if the maximum
benefits are to be gained from the knowledge system and
users are to be comfortable with its operation.
It is not unusual for any product involved with AI
to initially meet with some degree of user resistance and
skepticism. There may be several reasons for this and a
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concerted effort must be made from the system's introduction
to overcome this resistance. One approach is to emphasize
that the expert system is being introduced not in an attempt
to replace the decision making of the user, but rather as
an aid to the user that may save time or replace burdensome
tasks. Convincing a nonexpert to accept the expert system
is essential.
Another consideration associated with the integration
of the system is interfacing already existing systems or
databases. Although planning for this should originate in
earlier development stages, the actual interfacing takes
place during this stage and may prove challenging [Ref.
16] . Even so, the fact that an organization already has
data gathered in some organized manner should be considered
as a source of facts for the expert system. Data should be
viewed as a resource, and maximum use made of it.
Maintenance of a knowledge system varies from sys-
tem to system. But like any software product, it is required
and has considerable costs associated with it over the sys-
tem's life. An expert system may be translated into a common
language, such as BASIC or C, for improved efficiency or
portability reasons. In such cases the local user has very
limited maintenance capabilities. Any rule changes or
additions are performed by the developers. In some cases,
where the program is not translated into another language,
the users may be allowed to make specified modifications,
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which may include adding or modifying some rules. This
provides the benefit of having an independent product, but
requires more extensive training of users.
A major advantage of expert systems over algorithmic
programs is modularity. For knowledgeable users of existing
systems this has proven very beneficial and has reduced the
complexity of changes since only a segment need be changed.
Also, such modular changes do not affect other areas of the
program. The stages in the development of an expert system
are summarized in Figure 2.4.
E. DEVELOPMENT LANGUAGES AND TOOLS
This segment discusses the programming languages and
tools used in the development of knowledge systems. LISP
and PROLOG are the two symbolic programming languages most
frequently used in AI . They have features which make it
easier to build knowledge systems than do conventional
languages which are designed for numerical operations. These
two AI languages are more flexible than development tools,
but also more difficult for prototyping a new system. In
the past few years, several expert system building tools
have become available. Such tools have incorporated basic
knowledge engineering principles.
1 . Languages
LISP is the language most frequently used for build-
ing knowledge systems. Essentially, LISP does not differen-










Figure 2.4 Stages in an Expert System Development Life Cycle
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are used. Storage space is efficiently managed and program
modularity is a main feature. LISP's primary advantage
over other high level languages, such as FORTRAN or PASCAL,
is its ability to do symbolic processing. Symbolic pro-
gramming provides manipulation of strings of symbols with
logical, rather than numerical, operators.
Its greatest disadvantage is the requirement for a
LISP interpreter. LISP interpreters are currently available
for only a few computers. An interpreter serves to inter-
pret the LISP functions so they may be executed by the
hardware. Thus, an expert system written in a particular
LISP language can only run on computers for which there is
an interpreter for that language [Ref. 16]. As a result,
a company may have to invest in a new computer in order to
develop or implement a LISP-based expert system. LISP also
suffers from a lack of standardization; several dialects
exist.
Managers are frequently faced with the dilemma of
distributing a runtime version in LISP or translating the
LISP program into a more common language. The latter choice
has the disadvantage of requiring an extensive time for re-
write; however, this alternative may be cost effective if
many users require the software and don't have LISP compati-
ble hardware. This alternative also has the misfortune of
requiring all maintenance to the program to be done by the
developer.
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Another representational language for encoding ex-
pert knowledge is PROLOG. This logic programming language
was originally developed in Europe and is quite popular
internationally. It is based on a subset of first order
logic. Compared to conventional programming languages,
its syntax requirements are much less complex. PROLOG
has several distinctive features. These include that it is
rule-based, it uses pattern matching, and it uses automatic
backtracking [Ref . 17] . The same disadvantages associated
with LISP are applicable to PROLOG.
2 . Development Tools
A significant benefit of research over the past ten
years has been the creation of expert system development
tools that provide meaningful assistance in building expert
systems. These tools are basically the frame or skeleton
of an already existing expert system. The knowledge base,
which contains the rules and data unique to a particular
problem, is stripped away.
Expert system building tools do have several limi-
tations. Present designs of such tools have only been able
to capture certain types of knowledge that experts use in
solving specific types of problems, such as diagnosis or
prescription. Therefore one must insure a tool is appro-
priate to the problem prior to selecting a tool
.
Some of these software tools are written in LISP or
PROLOG and require AI capable hardware. Others have been
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rewritten in conventional high level application languages.
Each tool provides different methods of representing knowl-
edge and inference. They are marketed by both universities
and commercial companies, with the former's documentation
generally less developed than the commercial product's.
Support and training also tend to be better and more exten-
sive for the commercial product.
Even with the noted disadvantages, expert system
development tools have tremendous potential. King and
Harmon assert that the majority of expert systems developed
in the future will use expert system tools [Ref. 2:pp. 195-
209] . In fact, they go so far as to state that if one is
developing a large knowledge-based system and an expert
system development tool is not available, most knowledge
engineers would likely recommend discontinuation of the
project. The reasons are the substantial cost and time
required to develop an entire system from scratch.
F. SHORTCOMINGS
Although expert systems offer many benefits and have
vast potential, there are several shortcomings which should
be addressed. Development of such systems is not only
difficult, but expensive and time consuming. Development
and production costs are much higher than for other types
of programming. Costs for existing systems have ranged
from $100,000 to over a million dollars.
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Building knowledge systems is a lengthy process,
especially if built from scratch without the aid of a
development tool. Expert knowledge is often not well
formulated and easily extractable. Initial systems required
an average of twenty man years to develop, with more recent
systems still requiring as many as five man years. Never-
theless, research and development of expert building tools
can be expected to reduce this period in the future.
Although expert systems are solving problems that al-
gorithmic programs could not, they do not have the capa-
bility of a human expert. These programs are taken from
the deep knowledge of an expert; they consist of compiled
surface knowledge. Explanations for their reasoning is
rather shallow and novel situations are not solvable. Their
ability to interact with the user is primitive compared to
that of a human expert.
Presently, the most serious shortcoming in this field
is the severe shortage of trained knowledge engineers able
to develop these systems. Estimates have placed the number
of knowledge engineers in the United States from 250 to
350. Most are working in academia, think tanks, or a few
industrial labs. There are presently only a dozen or so
commercial companies developing and marketing knowledge
systems. Although the demand for knowledge base systems will
continue to grow, the lack of knowledge engineers is a con-
siderable constraint. Universities are not training many
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of these engineers. In reality, the learning process for
knowledge engineers has primarily been acquired by first-
hand interviewing of experts. This is a slow process. It
would seem that this shortage is likely to continue for the
near future.
G. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has covered many aspects of expert system
development. It was not intended to give detailed infor-
mation on successfully developed systems and their techno-
logical approaches. This information is readily available
from other sources. Rather, the intent was to convey
information on the major components of knowledge-based
systems and the approaches that make up knowledge system
development.
No single development taxonomy has yet emerged to
dominate this area. Many domain specific problem types
have yet to submit to some symbolic programming solution.
Although research is ongoing in these areas, progress is
slow.
It should be stressed that although several systems are
quite successful, just as in the case of most experts, these
programs are not infallible. They do make mistakes. They
also operate on complex problems at levels of success that
equal or exceed the human expert they are designed to
emulate. Chandrasedaran points out that the 80 percent/20
percent rule is quite applicable, i.e., it may be quite
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reasonable to efficiently and economically capture 80 per-
cent of the knowledge of a problem domain, but the remain-
ing 20 percent may require trade offs which are unacceptable
[Ref. 18]. These trade offs include such items as extremely
high costs for the knowledge captured, extraordinary time
requirements, or specifications which simply exceed the
technological capabilities of the field.
Expert systems may have a bright future, but there are
currently a number of constraints which restrict the growth
of this technology. Hayes-Roth cites the shortage of
skilled knowledge engineers, primitive development tools,
and the difficulty of the work as reasons current demand
of this technology exceeds supply [Ref. 19].
Knowledge systems will have a large impact on our society
in the future. They offer tremendous promise for signifi-
cant productivity increases in business. Some feel that
development tools will become as common as many popular
application programs such as Lotus 1-2-3 or VisiCalc are
today ([Ref. 2:p. 253]. There is a vast potential for ex-
pert systems to revolutionize the use and benefits of
computers to our society. The chapters which follow examine
the feasibility of applying this technology to the aircraft
maintenance discrepancy scheduling domain.
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III. MAINTENANCE CONTROL AND DISCREPANCY SCHEDULING
The previous chapter presented the basic concepts and
principles associated with expert systems and their develop-
ment. This chapter examines Maintenance Control, the area
of aircraft maintenance this study is evaluating for possible
implementation of a knowledge-based system.
Organizational maintenance functions are assigned to
squadrons by Reference 20, entitled the Naval Aviation Main-
tenance Program (NAMP) . This is commonly referred to as 0-
level maintenance and basically consists of inspecting,
troubleshooting, servicing and lubricating aircraft or air-
craft systems. It also allows for the removal and replace-
ment of parts and minor assemblies of the aircraft. Defective
components are repaired at a higher level of maintenance.
To ensure effective management, the NAMP has assigned a
standard organization for the 0-level maintenance depart-
ment. Figure 3.1 shows the organization for Navy and Marine
Corps 0-level units [Ref. 20:pp. 3-2-3]. It can be seen
from this figure that these organizations differ only slightly.
The organization is based on staff and line relationships.
Line relationships are direct supervisory relationships;
staff relationships are advisory in nature. Quality Assurance
and Maintenance Administration are the staff divisions at
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b. Marine Corps O-Level Organization
Figure 3.1 O-Level Maintenance Department Organization
have a line relationship. The central role of Maintenance
Control is depicted in these charts.
Maintenance departments vary in size from 100 to 250
personnel. The number of personnel assigned depends on the
number of aircraft assigned to a unit and the complexity
of the aircraft.
The remainder of this chapter describes the responsibili-
ties of the Maintenance Control Officer (MCO) , followed by
an examination of the prioritization of discrepancies. First,
some terminology related to aircraft readiness status must
be introduced.
A. AIRCRAFT READINESS REPORTING TERMS
Several terms are used specifically for describing the
material condition of aircraft. These terms are defined
in the following subparagraphs and are paraphrased from
definitions specified in Reference 20, pp. C-32-33.
1. Mission Capable
The material condition of an aircraft which indi-
cates it is capable of performing at least one and possibly
more of its designated missions. A common term used to
signify this condition is that the aircraft is "up," i.e.,
flyable. Mission Capable aircraft are divided into the
following two categories.
a. Full Mission Capable (FMC)
The material condition indicating that an air-
craft can perform all of its assigned missions.
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b. Partial Mission Capable (PMC)
The material condition of an aircraft indicating
that it can perform at least one, but not all, of its
missions. This category is further broken into two subcate-
gories. Partial Mission Capable Maintenance (PMCM) indi-
cates that the reason for the PMC status is because of
outstanding maintenance requirements which exist on the
inoperable systems. The second subcategory is Partial Mission
Capable Supply (PMCS) , indicating that the PMC condition
exists because maintenance cannot be performed because of
a supply shortage of the required material.
2. Not Mission Capable (NMC)
The material condition of an aircraft which indi-
cates it is unable to perform any of its missions. Aircraft
in this category are commonly referred to as being "down,"
i.e., nonflyable. There are two subcategories for this
status
.
a. Not Mission Capable Maintenance (NMCM)
Indicates that the aircraft is down because of
maintenance requirements.
b. Not Mission Capable Supply (NMCS)
The material condition of an aircraft which
indicates it is not capable of performing any of its mis-
sions because the maintenance necessary to repair the
discrepancy cannot continue because of a supply shortage
of required material. Most maintenance personnel seldom
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use these terms in their everyday discussions about aircraft.
To a large extent they use the simple terminology "up" and
"down" aircraft. An up aircraft is either FSC or PMC. A
down aircraft is one which is not flyable and could more
formally be described as either NMCM or NMCS.
B. MAINTENANCE/MATERIAL CONTROL
Maintenance Control is responsible for directing all
aircraft maintenance activities within a squadron. It is
the brain of the maintenance department, for from this work
center all work is assigned and coordinated.
The Maintenance Control Officer heads this workcenter.
Personnel staffing varies, depending on the number of air-
craft assigned to a squadron and the manpower assigned to
the maintenance department. Several maintenance controllers
and an E-7 or E-8 Maintenance Control Chief (MCC) are usual
staffing.
The NAMP sets forth many responsibilities for the MCO and
Maintenance Control division. Among the primary responsibili-
ties assigned the MCO are the control of the daily work load
and assignment of work priorities for the maintenance depart-
ment. This work center directs, coordinates, and monitors
all maintenance actions, ensuring all resources of the depart-
ment are used. Throughout the day the decisions that confront
the MCO are complex and dynamic.
Assigning the necessary aircraft assets to meet the
squadron's operational commitments is the overriding priority
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each day. A typical flight schedule will involve aircraft
launches in the morning, afternoon, and evening. Properly
configured aircraft to complete the scheduled mission must
be assigned. Frequently, not enough "up" aircraft are
available to assign one to each scheduled mission. Work must
then be directed to either turn around "up" aircraft that
return from earlier missions or repair aircraft not initially
capable of performing a given mission.
In order to maximize the aircraft operational readiness
the MCO/MCC seek to effectively and efficiently manage the
material and manpower resources available and direct these
resources in a manner that yields the most "up" and full
mission capable aircraft.
A key to the success of the maintenance department's
effort to maximize operational readiness is the scheduling
and prioritization of discrepancies to be worked on. Many
factors enter into this decision process, including the
available manpower and their qualifications, the expected
required repair time, the availability of needed equipment
and facilities, future commitments and deployments, etc.
The pertinent factors involved in the decision process will
be covered in detail below.
The MCO has considerable responsibilities in addition to
those previously cited. These include the planning of the
material support requirements for the department. Canni-
balization control procedures, technical directive
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incorporation, and scheduled maintenance planning are three
other responsibilities.
Cannibalization is the process of removing a good part
off one aircraft and the installation of this part on another
aircraft for which the part is defective and not immediately
available for issue from the supply system. Policies governing
cannibalization must be followed and the tradeoffs carefully
weighed. Scheduled maintenance is the periodic prescribed
inspection or servicing of aircraft, normally done on a
calendar of flight hour basis. This maintenance can be
planned for in advance. It includes such maintenance as
calendar and phased inspections or high time component removal.
Maintaining aircraft and equipment log books and weight
and balance records are also the responsibility of the MCO.
It also falls to him to maintain historical aircraft files
and monitor 3M documentation.
VIDS boards and material requisitions must be validated
daily by maintenance control. The responsibility for the
establishment and maintenance of a tool control program is
also assigned to the MCO, as well as formulation of the
monthly maintenance plan.
As the central control point for maintenance, this center
must constantly monitor and maintain cognizance of all
uncompleted maintenance actions. This environment is con-
stantly changing. New information is incessantly forthcoming.
Additional new unscheduled discrepancies are the result of
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returning aircraft missions where systems malfunctioned or
from mechanics and technicians that discover faults during
the normal course of their work.
The MCO is usually tasked with the responsibilities of
operating the squadron material control center. This is the
contact point within a maintenance department where material
and parts requirements are coordinated with the local supply
unit. Material control organizes the ordering, receipt, and
delivery of parts and material. All NMCS and PMCS requisi-
tions must be reconciled daily. Parts and material received
from supply must be reconciled daily. Parts and material
received from supply must be expeditioulsy distributed to
the appropriate work centers.
In addition to the previous functions performed by
maintenance control and material control, many unscheduled
and unforeseen nonmaintenance-related requests center here.
Personnel for work details, requests for tools or support
equipment, and any number of additional inquiries are actions
which must typically be handled during the course of the
day
.
Although this may seem to be just a long laundry list
of requirements, each plays a necessary and important role
to the overall management and operational success of the
maintenance department.
Figure 3.2 summarizes the major responsibilities of the
MCO and shows how diverse and demanding they are. It also
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* Assi gnmen t o f Wor k Fr i or i t i es
% Control of Daily Work Load
% Assign Aircraft to Meet Operational Flight Commitments
% Effectively Manage Material and Manpower Resources
* Control Cannibal i z at i on
* Direct Scheduled Maintenance
* Maintains Aircraft and Equipment Logs and Records
* Establishes and Maintains the Tool Control Program
% Responsible for Management of Material Control
Figure 3.2 Major Responsibilities of the MCO
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serves to place the planning and scheduling of maintenance
discrepancies into perspective with the many functions re-
quired of the MCO. It can be seen that planning is just
one of many areas that requires action daily. Extensive
amounts of time for this planning are simply not available
when one considers all other requirements with which the
MCO is tasked. A detailed examination of the decision
scheduling process is the subject of the next section.
C. DISCREPANCY SCHEDULING
The order in which aircraft deficiencies are worked on,
and the degree of utilization of the personnel, material,
and equipment resources, have a key impact on a unit's air-
craft operational readiness. If optimal scheduling decisions
are made, the personnel, material, and equipment resources
of the maintenance department are efficiently and effectively
used to achieve maximum aircraft readiness. Poor scheduling
decisions result in a decrease in combat readiness.
The prioritization of the discrepancies to be worked on
is considerably more complex than it might seem at first.
In this section the scheduling of discrepancies is carefully
examined. General aspects of the process are covered first.
The knowledge base that the decision maker uses is then
examined, followed by the many factors and heuristics that
enter into prioritization of discrepancies. The constraints
that influence and restrict decision making are discussed
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next, and closing comments are made on the process as a whole
and the difficulty of acquiring the knowledge used in the
decision process.
The material in this section was largely gathered through
interviews with several professional maintenance personnel.
They were selected on the basis of their experience in main-
tenance control and excellent professional reputations. They
had recently served, or were serving, in the billet of MCO
or MCC. On average they had ten to fifteen years experience
in aircraft maintenance. Both senior enlisted and officers
were interviewed.
The following list provides the objectives sought from
the interviews.
- Observe the environment in which the scheduling
decision is made.
- Determine the rules used by the MCO/MCC in scheduling
priorities
.
- Determine the knowledge base used by the MCO/MCC.
- Determine the constraints affecting the decision
process.
- Determine how planning decisions were made.
The interview process was not unlike that experienced by
the novice knowledge engineer whose investigation into the
problem domain reaches the stage for the first interviews
with the experts. This is categorized as part of the prob-
lem identification stage specified in Chapter II. In this
case, an attempt to capture the fundamental considerations
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and heuristics used in prioritizing maintenance discrepancy
scheduling were the goals.
1. Decision Environment
The work priorities for the work centers are assigned
at maintenance control meetings that occur two or three
times a day. These meetings are headed by the MCO and the
MCC; all work center supervisors attend.
The meetings include not only the scheduling of air-
craft discrepancies, but also other information or tasks
which may be pertinent to a work center. For instance, an
aircraft may have to be towed to a particular area or hangar,
or a work center tasked to configure an aircraft for a later
mission, perhaps adding auxilliary fuel tanks. Information
that is not related to maintenance on an aircraft, but
which may affect the work center or department during the
work day, is also covered. Examples are announcements of a
squadron formation or air station quiet hours. Generally,
flight schedule commitments, priority of discrepancies to
be worked on, and any actions or activities that might affect
a work center, its personnel, or the department are presented
at these meetings.
Determination of the work priorities is normally
made jointly by the MCO and the MCC. The MCC draws up the
work schedule and then discusses it with the MCO. The MCC
focuses primarily on meeting the immediate flight schedule
commitments and maximizing the number of up aircraft. Knowl-
edge and heuristics are used in arriving at a conclusion.
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The MCO brings a longer range perspective to the
process. In addition to the more immediate concerns of the
MCC, considerations such as upcoming deployments, high time
component changes, future mission requirements, and other
department considerations often guide the MCO's decision
making.
Most squadrons determine the general work plan two
or three times during the course of the day. After the
aircraft assignments are made to cover the morning flights,
a general work priority schedule for the day is determined.
This schedule lists the projected discrepancies to be worked
on during the day. Emphasis is on the jobs scheduled for
the morning. Discrepancies are assigned by work center
and aircraft. Sufficient discrepancies to keep each of the
work centers working through the morning are assigned.
This planning process normally requires from thirty
to sixty minutes to draw up. Anywhere from twenty to forty
discrepancies are assigned priorities and issued to work
centers by order of precedence. These figures vary depending
on the size and type of squadron and experience of the
schedulers.
In many squadrons a modified work schedule is drawn
up and a meeting held in the late morning. This modification
incorporates new priorities resulting from new gripes from
morning flights that have returned, as well as additional
available information from discrepancy troubleshooting
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performed in the morning. The late morning schedule pri-
marily covers the work to be performed in the afternoon.
Another work schedule is prepared and a meeting held
in the late afternoon. This meeting updates the status of
jobs in progress and lists priorities for the night crew.
This shift normally works from 1600 to 2400. Minor modifi-
cations are made throughout the day to the general work
plan as new information is received and priorities change.
It should be mentioned that the scheduling process
is made in a less than ideal decision making environment.
Conventional configuration for a standard maintenance con-
trol is a large open office. It is the communications hub
of the entire department. There is seldom any partitioning
that would give some degree of privacy to those involved.
While the MCO/MCC attempts to make an optimal work
schedule, phones may be ringing or parts arriving. Per-
sonnel may seek guidance from the decision makers, they may
receive phone calls, or may be completely pulled away from
the process by an urgent event or beckon from a superior.
It is under these somewhat adverse conditions that
crucial scheduling decisions are often made. Unfortunately,
the decision makers do not have the luxury of isolating them-
selves from the many disturbances or making the decision in
an undisturbed environment. In fact, many intentionally
attempt to make the schedule while still tuning into the
conversations and happenings occurring around them, not
wishing to lose contact with up to the minute events.
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The morning scheduling process takes place in a less
adverse environment, since it is largely formulated prior
to the majority of worker's arrival for work. The afternoon
and night-crew schedule formulations are not as fortunate.
Conditions previously described are fully evident.
2 . Priorities
Investigation determined that a number of rules and
considerations are taken into account in deciding the priority
of discrepancies. The material which follows is an attempt
to structure into a basic classification scheme, the priori-
ties most often used by the professional maintenance per-
sonnel interviewed. No attempt to give weighted values was
made, although it is evident that such is the case for many
of the rules when actually applied.
a. Flight Schedule Commitments
The squadron flight schedule is produced daily
by the Operations Department and covers the next day '
s
flights. It is a planning document that lists the mission
number, pilots, takeoff and landing times, type of mission,
and any special notes or configurations about the mission.
Typically, there is a set of morning, afternoon, and night
launches.
Meeting the flight schedule requirements with
safely flyable aircraft assets is the number one priority
for maintenance each day. All available resources will be
expended to insure aircraft are preflighted and configured
on time for each assigned flight.
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The first consideration each morning is to
assign aircraft to each event on that morning's flight
schedule. These aircraft must be properly configured and
capable of performing the assigned mission. Frequently,
one or two aircraft are assigned as backups to replace any
aircraft that go down prior to launch. Although this process
is not a part of the discrepancy scheduling process, it has
the effect of determining which aircraft are available to
be worked on. Depending on the time of the next launch,
additional aircraft may be set aside to meet later events.
These aircraft are not usually available to be worked on
either.
Should insufficient up aircraft be available for
the next launch, the MCO/MCC is left with three possible
alternatives. One of the up aircraft returning from the
morning launch may be turned around and assigned the after-
noon launch. A second alternative requires the remaining
aircraft to be configured or repaired in time to be assigned
the afternoon mission. In either case, a degree of uncer-
tainty results, uncertainty the MCO/MCC prefers to not have
to contend with. The third and least desirable alternative
•is to cancel the event.
b. Downing Discrepancies
As described earlier, downing discrepancies are
those which prevent an aircraft from flying. A primary goal
of maintenance is to minimize the number of down aircraft.
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Of all the discrepancies on the squadron's aircraft, these
receive a high priority.
A primary consideration when scheduling these
discrepancies is the elapsed repair time for all the downing
discrepancies against an aircraft. Besides the elapsed
maintenance time for the repair itself, the time for any
associated inspections or other actions are also included
when determining the overall elapsed time requirements. For
example, when an engine is changed, a special inspection
requiring technical assistance must be performed. A test
flight is also necessary prior to the aircraft being returned
to an up status and released as safe for flight. The esti-
mated time needed for these requirements is figured into the
overall elapsed time to repair the discrepancy itself.
The aircraft whose total downing discrepancies
require the least amount of estimated elapsed time for re-
pair is normally worked on first. This is a primary rule
used to decide on which discrepancy to work. Other considera-
tions come into play when making this time estimate. These
will be discussed later.
c. Up Discrepancies
There are many considerations when it comes to
determining the priority of up discrepancies. Normally only
gripes that are awaiting maintenance (i.e., not waiting for
parts from supply) or are being trouble-shot to determine
the cause of the problem are considered.
68
One method of differentiating is to weight
PMC(M) discrepancies at a higher precedence than non-PMC (M)
.
Again, as with downing discrepancies, one normally wishes to
minimize PMC(M) gripes. Further prioritization often exists
within the PMC(M) category itself. It is based upon the
mission importance and frequency of use of a system. An
example is giving a weighted advantage in scheduling to an
IFF system discrepancy, which may be necessary for many
missions, compared to a discrepancy on the FM radio, which
is used rather infrequently. Both of these are PMC dis-
crepancies. The system that is more important, in the
judgment of the MCO/MCC, is given priority. This ranking
process is used not only for determining the precedence of
discrepancies against the same aircraft, but also in deciding
between two aircraft with PMC(M) discrepancies.
Low priority up discrepancies are sometimes con-
sidered for aircraft which are projected to meet later
launches in the day and for which there is minimal risk that
working on the gripe could lead to the aircraft's downing.
A low priority up discrepancy is one that is minor in nature
and has a small impact on the aircraft's ability to perform
its mission. Low priority up discrepancies have a low possi-
bility of degrading an aircraft's status when trouble-shot
or repaired, i.e., turning into down or PMC gripes. A




Another rule some units apply is to consider the
age of the up discrepancy when determining priority. For
instance, a lower priority gripe over thirty days old and
still AWM, is given an increase in priority in a unit
stressing no AWM gripes greater than thirty days old. Also,
there may be a rule which states that an aircraft is placed
on maintenance hold if it has greater than some number of
AWM gripes, perhaps fifteen.
The two previous rules are established to insure
minor up discrepancies don't become excessive. The previous
rules are examples of the use of rules to determine priori-
ties amongst up discrepancies. The weight each might receive
may vary from squadron to squadron. Nonetheless, they are
examples of additional rules which are frequently considered
in scheduling prioritization.
d. Scheduled Maintenance/High Time Components
Maintenance planners must also consider scheduled
maintenance and high time component changes in their over-
all work scheme.
(1) Scheduled Maintenance . Scheduled maintenance
is maintenance which occurs at a set time. Examples are
seven and fourteen day inspections or phased inspections
(which are based on a certain flight hour interval) . This
maintenance is required and an aircraft is carried in a
nonflyable status once it becomes necessary to perform this
maintenance. To allow for some flexiblity, these inspections
may be waived for a day or for a short number of flight
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hours, usually no greater than ten percent of the phase
hour interval.
One consideration for phased or major
flight interval inspections is the workload already assigned
to the phase work center. Because of the manning of the
work center and the nature of the work (usually performed
in a sequenced manner) only one aircraft will be inducted
into this work center at a time. This limitation is another
constraint that must be considered when planning.
(2) High Time Components . Many major components
on an aircraft are allowed a certain number of flight hours
and then replaced or removed for inspection. This includes
dynamic components, engines, generators, and transmissions.
To allow for flexibility in scheduling
this maintenance, there frequently is a range of time during
which they may be changed. For example, an engine may
have a 600 hour limitation with a ten percent extension that
allows it to be flown up to 660 flight hours after its
installation.
High time component changes usually require
considerable time and manpower for removal and replacement.
They also frequently require a post maintenance functional
test flight. They are often ordered at a low priority in
advance of their change time. When the replacement com-
ponent is received by supply, increased priority is frequently
given to scheduling such maintenance, even though the required
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elapsed repair hours may be greater than other rules which
govern scheduling precedence.
e. Other Considerations
There are other factors which may influence the
MCO/MCC's decision on what discrepancies to give preference.
The following factors were considerations in the decision
process with all the persons interviewed.
(1) SPINTAC . Aircraft that have not flown in
sixty days are termed special interest aircraft (SPINTAC)
.
The most common scenario that leads to an aircraft becoming
SPINTAC commonly involves an aircraft going down for a
major component and a rather long expected delivery date for
the part. Such an aircraft frequently becomes a source for
cannibalization parts for other aircraft. Because of
cannibalization, it is not unusual for such an aircraft to
end up with five to fifteen major parts on order against
it.
Because of aircraft safety concerns, there
has been high level interest in minimizing this category
of aircraft. Increased supply attention is given for out-
standing parts. There are pressures on all commanders to
minimize SPINTAC aircraft. As a result, many commands take
somewhat extreme actions to avoid allowing an aircraft to
exceed this sixty day no fly period. This includes the
cannibalization of major components not readily available
in the supply system.
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In many commands, aircraft which could go
SPINTAC in anywhere from ten to fifteen days, high work
priority is given to the down discrepancies. Even though
giving such priority may be in contradiction to other rule
considerations previously discussed, this priority is
necessary if the aircraft is to be repaired and thus avoid
SPINTAC status.
(2) Aircraft That Are "Flyers" . In many squad-
rons one or two aircraft often seem to have the reputation
for staying up and outflying other aircraft. They are the
"flyers" of a squadron, and often receive priority in
scheduling simply because of this reputation. No rational
reason can be given for this. As in the case of SPINTAC
aircraft, the priorities given such aircraft often take
precedence over other rules used to determine priority in
scheduling.
(3) Parts Received . Often, maintenance initially
trouble-shoots a discrepancy and determines that a part is
bad and must be replaced. At this point material control
orders the part from supply. It may be in stock and de-
livered in an hour or so or it may not be in stock and
have to be ordered from the supply system.
When the ordered part is received from
supply, a weighted priority is often given to scheduling
its installation. One reason for this priority is the fact
that the initial troubleshooting has been completed and a
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part determined to be the cause of the problem. The degree
of uncertainty as to the cause is thus reduced. The MCO/
MCC consequently has more definitive information with which
to make his decision and a good likelihood that replacing
the part will resolve the discrepancy.
A second consideration stems from the
desire to minimize the amount of time a part is held before
installation. This reduces the probability that the com-
ponent may be lost, misplaced, or damaged if it sits around.
The MCO has no desire to be a mini supply warehouse. For
such reasons, when a part is received (even in the case of
a low priority up discrepancy) , it is frequently given assignment
priority.
3 . Constraints
Several constraints influence or restrict the
scheduling of discrepancies. The MCO/MCC has a limited
number of resources which he must efficiently use. Con-
straints may be classified as either fixed or variable.
Fixed constraints are those that are basically unchanging
and known by the planners. Hangar space and amount of Ground
Support Equipment (GSE) are examples.
Variable constraints vary from day to day and hour
by hour. They often involve a degree of uncertainty when
considered. Personnel availability or technical represen-
tative assistance are examples.
In the material that follows, fixed constraints are
discussed first, followed by variable constraints.
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a. Hangar Space
Hangar space is a limited resource. In many
units two or three aircraft are all that may be hangared
at one time. A hangar may provide several benefits, such
as protection from the elements, lighting for improved
working conditions at night, or perhaps an overhead crane
or high pressure air.
Closely related to this constraint are the work
areas available on board ship when a squadron is deployed.
This restriction is even more limiting because of the fewer
available spaces to work on aircraft. This constraint must
be taken into consideration when planning the overall main-
tenance schedule and priorities.
b. IMRL
Each squadron has an allocation of special tools
for its type of aircraft based upon the Individual Material
Readiness List (IMRL). This list is based on the number of
assigned aircraft and the possible tactical missions with
which the unit is tasked. Thus the number of special tools
is limited. This restriction has to be taken into account
when deciding the jobs to be assigned and the tools necessary
to do the task.
c. PME/Test Equipment
Precision Measuring Equipment (PME) is the cali-
brated test equipment and tools a unit possesses. As with
IMRL equipment, PME is limited. Because this gear must be
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turned in periodically for calibration, the amount on hand
may also vary.
d. GSE
GSE includes the tractors, electrical power and
hydraulic units, workstands, etc. The amount of this equip-
ment is limited and some is subject to mechanical failure
and repair. This is another area that somewhat constrains
the ability to assign discrepancies to be worked on. For
example, two aircraft may each have down hydraulic system
discrepancies that require use of a hydraulic test unit. If
the squadron only has one hydraulic test unit available,
one of the jobs that may originally have been given priority
by other rules, is forced to be delayed until the other job
is completed and the hydraulic unit freed.
e. Personnel
This is the first of the variable constraints to
be described. How to employ all the personnel assets effi-
ciently is a constant challenge for the MCO/MCC. Personnel
available in the various work centers vary from day to day
and hour by hour. Many factors affect this. When drawing
up the work schedule the MCO/MCC must consider not only the
number of personnel available, but also the technical capa-
bilities and training of the personnel. These factors
influence the estimate of the time to complete a task.
Valuable information on a work center's personnel
situation requires good communications between the MCC and
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the work center supervisor. Because the personnel factor is
such a dynamically changing variable, it is constantly
reassessed.
f. Type of Discrepancy
Some discrepancies restrict other discrepancies
on the same aircraft from being worked on simultaneously.
For instance, a discrepancy that will likely involve the
breaking of a hydraulic line prohibits any electrical power
from being applied to the aircraft because of the danger of
fire. Therefore, for safety reasons, the MCC would not
schedule an avionics discrepancy to be worked on at the
same time as a hydraulic-related job.
Another consideration in this area involves
assigning a job component that later has to be redone when
another discrepancy is repaired. Two discrepancies, one
of which called for the replacement of the electrical
generator and the other requiring the transmission to be
changed are an example. In the course of removing and re-
placing a transmission, the generator must be removed from
the old transmission and installed on the new. Thus, it
is better to first remove and replace the transmission and
then replace the generator.
g. Local Constraints
Other factors occasionally influence work
priorities. Noise abatement periods are sometimes issued.
They preclude engine turnups or aircraft takeoffs during a
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specified period. These periods are usually announced a
few days in advance. They restrict certain types of main-
tenance that require power units or aircraft turnups.
For some units, especially those located in cold
climates in the winter or extremely hot climates during the
summer/ restrictions will apply as to when or where aircraft
may be worked on. These restrictions simply place additional
constraints on the decision process.
h. Support
Some repairs require technical assistance from
higher echelon maintenance activities. These jobs are thus
dependent on this assistance being available. Close liaison
and careful planning are necessary so that the necessary
assistance is available to complete this job in a timely
manner.
Technical representatives are frequently called
in for assistance when a discrepancy is difficult to
diagnose or fix. These personnel are very limited. Fre-
quentl one representative supports several squadrons. If
this assistance is necessary, a delay of several hours is
not unusual before a representative may be available for
assistance. This delay must be planned for.
4 . Knowledge Base
If one were to consolidate a knowledge base that the
MCO/MCC draw from in the course of applying their scheduling
techniques, it could be separated into three broad
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classifications: prioritization rules, aircraft systems
knowledge, and parts availability.
a. General Prioritization Heuristics
The various prioritization heuristics, discussed
above, are a critical element of the MCO/MCC's knowledge
base. They are used for determining what jobs to work on
and the priority to assign them. These rules are joined in
different combinations and are given different weights. The
research conducted in this study has only touched on the
very basic and elementary rules used for decision making.
They are broad enough to substantiate the complexity of
the scheduling process in this domain and provide an under-
standing of the method priorities are determined.
b. Aircraft Systems Knowledge
An aircraft system is composed of the major func-
tioning components that constitute the aircraft. This
knowledge consists of information about the major parts
that are combined to form a system, as well as technical
knowledge of the functioning of the system itself.
For example, a typical UHF radio system is
composed of several major components which include such
items as the radio transmitter and receiver unit, the fre-
quency control box, the antenna, and the coaxial cable that
connects the components.
Some major components have subsystems asso-
ciated with them that are themselves systems. The aircraft
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engine system consists of the major components of the engine,
as well as such subsystems as the start system and the fuel
system.
The MCO and MCC draw on their knowledge of the
aircraft's systems in the prioritizing process. Two concepts
related to systems are frequently applied in formulating the
maintenance schedule. First is the history of the system
itself with respect to a particular aircraft model. Has the
system had a frequent failure rate? Does a particular com-
ponent of the system have an unusually high history of failure?
Secondly, the history of the system associated with the indi-
vidual aircraft is considered. Has this system failed recently
on this aircraft? What action was taken to repair the first
instance? How long ago was the repair completed? Is it
a repeat discrepancy or similar to the previous discrepancy?
Incorporating this type of consideration into
the decision strategy may allow the MCO/MCC to make his deci-
sion from a more informed point of view. This type of infor-
mation is part of the expert's knowledge base. Such information
on systems is not instantly available to an expert. It is
acquired over the course of several months or several years
experience with a particular aircraft model. When initially
making decisions on an aircraft model with which the expert
has not gained such systems knowledge, uncertainty increases
for the decision process. Although specific information of
this nature is available from the specialists who repair
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the system, the MCO/MCC seldom has the luxury to call on
these personnel for every system he may be uncertain about.
A decision is made with the available knowledge.
A second systems-related concept is the time to
complete a repair. Over time, MCO/MCCs build up a general
knowledge of the elapsed time requirements to complete a.
repair. This includes time necessary for troubleshooting,
removal and replacement of the faulty component, and any
necessary inspections required. Expected repair times
play a key role in deciding on which discrepancies to
give priorities. This is discussed in greater detail in
Chapter V.
c. Parts Availability
There are two sources of parts available to
replace a faulty component. The normal, and most frequently
used is the supply system. The MCO/MCC is concerned whether
a particular part is available at the local supply level or
whether a requisition has to be sent off station to procure
the part. This is factored into their judgment in decid-
ing which jobs to give priority. Discrepancies for which
the expected parts are readily available are given a higher
priority.
Even though a certain part is not usually avail-
able from supply, the MCO/MCC may still consider working
on the discrepancy, knowing that he may cannibalize the
likely part from another down aircraft. Considerations
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include the amount of time and effort necessary to remove
such a part and how fragile the part is to possible breakage
or damage during the process of removal. Some components
are never cannibalized because of this,
d. Personnel Capabilities
Another bank of knowledge often used, by main-
tenance controllers concerns the personnel resource they
have to work with. Enough work, but not too much, must
be assigned. Not only a knowledge of the number of per-
sonnel available in a given work center, but their general
level of technical competence, are used in the decision
making process.
The degree of training and knowledge a work
center's personnel have, directly affects other decision
factors. For example, if a work center has many new per-
sonnel not trained or familiar with an aircraft's systems,
it can be expected that additional time is required to
fix a given discrepancy. This significantly influences the
elapsed time of repair consideration and is used in assign-
ing the quantity and priority of discrepancies.
5 . Conclusions/Comments
a. Complexity of the Decision Process
The discussion in this section points out the
complexity of the discrepancy scheduling process. The
decision maker must attempt to balance and tradeoff any
number of dynamic factors in making a master work schedule.
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Analysis indicates that the process can be broken down
into a taxonomy of basic heuristics, with knowledge of a
particular aircraft model applied.
A fundamental question asked of the experts
during the course of the interviews, dealt with whether the
same intrinsic decision process would apply if they were
switched to another type of aircraft. All strongly agreed
that it would. The factors that would change are the con-
straints and knowledge of the new aircraft's systems. Changes
to the rules and their basic decision making methodology
would only be slightly modified.
b. Difficulties Encountered
The interviews with the maintenance professionals
were conducted to uncover the basic concepts and strategies
they use in this domain. It must be recognized that the
concepts and factors expressed here represent only a fraction
of those used by the decision makers in solving the problem
of what to schedule for work. Nevertheless, the formaliza-
tion attempted here should be a good starting point for
future work in this domain. It also serves to point out
that the decision process is relatively structured.
Waterman points out that it is seldom effective
to ask the expert to directly express the rules and methods
used for solving the problems in their domain [Ref. 10:
p. 153] :
"Experts," it appears, have a tendency to state their
conclusions and the reasoning behind them in general
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terms that are too broad for effective machine analysis.
It is advantageous to have the machine work at a more
basic level, dealing with clearly defined pieces of
basic information that it can build into more complex
judgments. In contrast, the expert seldom operates
at a basic level. He makes complex judgments rapidly,
without laboriously reexamining and restating each
step in his reasoning process. The pieces of basic
knowledge are assumed and are combined so quickly that
it is difficult for him to describe the process. When
he examines a problem, he cannot easily articulate
each step and may even be unaware of the individual
steps taken to reach a solution. He may ascribe to
intuition or label a hunch that which is the result of a
very complex reasoning process based upon a large
amount of remembered data and experience. In subse-
quently explaining his conclusion or hunch he will
repeat only the major steps, often leaving out most
of the smaller ones, which may have seemed obvious to
him at the time. Knowing what to consider basic and
relevant and not requiring further reevaluation is what
makes a person an "expert."
This quote concisely describes the difficulties
encountered in the course of attemptint to discover the
factors that make up the discrepancy scheduling process
for the domain. In fact, at the conclusion of the inter-
view, each interviewee was asked to read this passage and
all agreed it expressed the exact difficulties they had
wrestled with in preparing for the interview.
The next chapter examines the NALCOMIS hardware
and software assets that are proposed for installation in
every aviation squadron. Many of the requirements of the
system are designed to be of aid to the MCO/MCC.
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IV. NALCOMIS
The mission of operational maintenance and material
units is to maximize aircraft mission readiness by main-
taining high material -condition standards [Ref. 21:p. 1].
In the mid-1970s it was determined that the existing manual
information system was inadequate to support the effec-
tive management of Naval Aviation maintenance and material,
especially with the manpower and fiscal restrictions then
in effect.
The manual system was slow, onerous, and labor inten-
sive. Management requirements in the maintenance and
material support areas were becoming increasingly complex
as sophisticated aircraft weapon systems entered the inven-
tory and as the operational tempo of units increased.
NALCOMIS was proposed as a means of providing a modern,
responsive computer-based Management Information System
(MIS) for this domain. The scope of the system is limited
to support of the organizational maintenance activity
(OMA) , aircraft intermediate maintenance department (AIMD)
,
and supply support center (SSC) [Ref. 22:p. 2-1].
This chapter focuses on NALCOMIS at the organizational
maintenance level, its history, components, and the current
status of the prototype. Possible modifications and changes
in configuration to the NALCOMIS system are addressed. No
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attempt is made to analyze the current NALCOMIS hardware
and software prototype configuration, however. Such analy-
sis is beyond the scope of this research and, furthermore,
the latest prototype software for the OMA has not yet been
delivered.
A. HISTORY
Development Milestone I for NALCOMIS was approved in
February, 19 77. This milestone required the project to
use SNAP hardware, authorized development of a system de-
sign, and selected MCAS Cherry Point, NC as the prototype
site. It also specified that the operational prototype
system must be approved prior to installation of hardware
at any other site [Ref. 21:Encl. (1) p. 1]
.
In January, 1979, approval of Milestone II permitted
the full scale development and testing of the prototype
system. Because of delays in the procurement of the SNAP
hardware, development of the software was begun on a Perkin-
Elmer minicomputer. It was not until June, 19 82 that the
SNAP contract was awarded to Honeywell Information Systems,
Inc. July, 19 83, saw the delivery of a Honeywell minicom-
puter to the prototype site. The converted Perkin-Elmer
software, termed NALCOMIS Standard Environment, proved to
be inefficient when run on the Honeywell hardware.
Unacceptable terminal response times were the most serious
problem.
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A competitive contract was issued in late 1983 for
redesign of the application software. The new prototype
software is to be delivered prior to the end of this year
and will undergo several months of testing and evaluation.
In the interim, there has been a proposal to permit
deployment of the AIMD software module, which has bee-
tested and certified. This deployment concept has beer.
approved and allows the procurement and deployment of the
hardware necessary for this implementation. It is uncertain
how much of the requested fu
project in the FY-86 budget.
Upon successful completion of Milestone II, Milestone
III will seek deployment of the hardware required for full
implementation at the OMA, AIMD, and SSC for ail approved
NALCOMIS sites [Ref. 21:p. 2].
B. OBJECTIVES
The NALCOMIS Mission Element Needs Statement identified
three major management deficiencies at rhe OMA, AIME,
and SSC. They were: a lack of real-time management
information, a difficult data collection process, and
inadequate and inaccurate upline information [Ref. 21:
Encl. (1) : p. 1]
.
The current information system ioes not accommodate the
efficient processing of rhe mass of available raw data
in the timely and coherent fashion needed for real-ti
=
~
decision making. A second shortcoming is the inability of
the present system to support responses to individual
queries in an accurate and timely manner [Ref. 23:p. 1-6].
The present data collection process is largely manual.
It is labor intensive and there are significant error
rates in the data reported. Frequent updating and revali-
dation are necessary. Finally, most of the information
provided by the data is out of date.
Upper level commands suffer from the incomplete,
erroneous, and untimely data of the present reporting sys-
tem. This seriously affects higher echelon's ability to
manage logistical demands, budget justification, personnel
staffing, etc.
Objectives to correct each of these major shortcomings
are established for NALCOMIS. The following is a list of
the minimum specific objectives for NALCOMIS [Ref. 23:
p. 1-9] :
- Provide timely and accurate information to main-
tenance and material managers to improve their
effectiveness
.
- Improve the number of FMC aircraft.
- Reduce the NMCS and NMCM rates
.
- Reduce the supply response time when maintenance
requisitions parts.
- Respond more quickly when maintenance demands
requisition status for parts on order.
- Achieve a reduction in beyond the capability of
maintenance (BCM) actions at the AIMD for components
which may be repaired locally.
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- Improve the visibility of critical rotable pool
items
.
- Reduce the maintenance and supply personnel man-hours
required for data collection, entry, and validation.
- Improve the quality and timeliness of data used for
upline reporting.
- Reduce awaiting parts inventory levels at the SSC.
- Reduce the administrative burden of maintenance
personnel in meeting 3M system requirements.
- Provide local control of information.
C
. HARDWARE
The material presented in the following two sections
relates to OMA requirements and is largely condensed from
Reference 3. The hardware is a ruggedized version of
off the shelf commercial equipment. It incorporates the
architecture of the Honeywell DPS 6 system.
This DPS 6 system consists of 16 and 32 bit processors
The OMA version is designated the DPS 6/54 model and has
one Mbyte of memory, expandable to two Mbytes. This model
uses an asynchronous bidirectional bus architecture and
can support up to forty communications lines. Mass
storage units, printers, communications controllers, etc.,
may be attached.
Cycle time is 300 nanoseconds. Direct memory access
is used for all data transfers. There is a tie-breaking
network which prevents lock-up of the bus. The central
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Figure 4.1 NALCOMIS Hardware and Software
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Memory save is provided by a battery backup system.
Primary storage is provided by six Winchester disk drives,
each of which has 52 Mbytes of storage capacity. Each
squadron also has a tape drive for historical storage of
data. Two diskette drives, video display terminals, and
a printer are also included in the system configuration.
This material is condensed in Figure 4.1.b.
D. SOFTWARE
This section briefly describes the software used by
NALCOMIS. This can be divided into two categories,
Honeywell developed software and the NALCOMIS application
software now in prototype development.
1. Honeywell Software
To minimize project risk, off the shel software
was provided by Honeywell. Honeywell furnished the operat-
ing system, data base management system, transaction
processing system, and compilers (Figure 4.1.c).
The operating system is the GC0S6 MOD 400. It is a
real-time disk-oriented system which allows interactive
dialogue for multiple users. Both real-time activities
and batch processing may be run concurrently.
The Honeywell Integrated Data Store (IDS-II) data
base management system is used for the system. This system
provides real-time and multiuser capability and serves to
control communications between data in the mass storage
units and the user. Data integrity, independence, and
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security are provided by the system. A query language is
furnished in the form of GEN 5 software [Ref. 22:p. 4-3].
The data manipulation language is COBOL-based.
Transaction processing allows for the scheduling,
loading, and execution of real-time programs. The Honeywell
Interactive Transaction Processing System satisfies this
requirement. It supports data base and file sharing among
multiple users.
An ANSI -COBOL- 7 4 compiler is used since all pro-
grams must be written in COBOL. This is in keeping with
government requirements. Maintenance and software updates
are furnished by Honeywell Information Systems under contract
with the government.
2 . Application Software
The initial application software developed was
termed the NALCOMIS Standard Interface. As previously men-
tioned, it proved unsatisfactory, and a contract was let
for a new version of the application software. This new
software is given the name "native mode" and is designed
specifically for the DPS 6 system. The OMA version is to
be delivered for prototyping in late 1985.
The OMA software may be broken into the following
eight functional subsystems:
- Flight Activity Subsystem
- Maintenance Activity Subsystem
- Configuration Management Subsystem
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- Maintenance Personnel Management Subsystem
- Asset Management Subsystem
- Supply Support Center Subsystem
- Local/Upline Reporting Subsystem
- System Support Subsystem
Additional information on these various subsystems
is available in Reference 2.
E. EXPANDABILITY
One of the key advantages of the Honeywell DPS 6 system
is its capability for modification. The main memory of
the DPS 6/54, used at the OMA, may be expanded rather easily
and economically to two Mbytes. Additional memory expansion
up to 16 Mbytes may be possible. Winchester disks may
also be added for increased mass storage. Although not part
of the present contract, supplemental compilers are available
These include higher level language compilers for FORTRAN,
BASIC, and C.
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V. A KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR THE MAINTENANCE SCHEDULING DOMAIN
Chapter II defined knowledge base as that portion of
an expert system that contains the facts and heuristics of
the problem domain. In many cases the knowledge base, i.e.,
the domain specific facts and rules, may be the key differ-
ence between two different expert systems. For two systems
developed using the same expert system building tool, only
the knowledge bases differ. This chapter presents a
recommendation for a basic knowledge base necessary for an
expert system for scheduling discrepancies in aviation main-
tenance and implemented with NALCOMIS. Chapter II listed
rules, aircraft systems knowledge, and parts availability
information as key items in a knowledge base for this domain.
These items also underlie the discussion of the knowledge
base in this chapter. The discussion begins with general
comments on planning and scheduling, the generic category
of expert systems under which this problem falls.
A. PLANNING/SCHEDULING DOMAINS
The development of planning or scheduling expert systems
has been primarily theoretical and research lab oriented.
Wilensky, Sacerdoti , and Stefik have written books on the
subject of planning, but these works are not specifically
related to the problem domain being studied [Refs. 24,25,
26] . There are a few articles on the planning process in
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general which have gone so far as to build models. Again,
these articles had little relation to the problem posed
[Refs. 27,28]
.
The only article that could be found that deals exclusively
with planning and scheduling describes a research system
termed ISIS [Ref. 29]. It is a knowledge-based decision
support system for job shop scheduling. In some ways this
problem domain is similar to aircraft maintenance scheduling.
SRL, a frame-based language, was used to build the ISIS
system [Ref. 29:p. 30], Although this is the only example
of the scheduling task that could be found, it does lend
support that it is possible to develop expert systems in a
complex scheduling domain.
One other potential source of information was discovered
as this thesis was in the finishing stages. A brochure
for the First International Expert Systems Conference, to
be held 1-3 October 1985 in London, listed one of the pre-
sentations as "An Expert Fuzzy Planner for Scheduling Air-
craft Repair Work." Squadron Leader T.J. Grant of the
Ministry of Defence was the speaker. An attempt to obtain
reference materials on this research proved unsuccessful.
B. KNOWLEDGE FROM THE PRESENT DATA BASE
Hayes-Roth points out that it has become common for
knowledge systems to access and retrieve information from
on-line data bases [Ref. 30:p. 15]. Other works have
pointed out the practical benefits to be gained, strategies
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for extracting data, and the research challenges presented
in coupling an expert system to a data base [Refs. 31,32].
An expert system for this domain requires data from the
NALCOMIS data base be used extensively.
The requirement to use NALCOMIS obviously adds com-
plexity to designing a system for the maintenance domain.
Nevertheless, it is far too inefficient to consider any
other way of acquiring the facts needed for the knowledge
base. The redundancy of data is unnecessary and undesirable.
The following paragraphs look at the data in the NALCOMIS
data base that are related to a maintenance scheduling
knowledge base. It should be remembered that a knowledge
base consists of facts and heuristics. The NALCOMIS data
base contains only some of the facts but none of the rules
required for the knowledge base.
1. Aircraft Facts
The data base has hundreds of facts that might be
used by an expert system. The majority of this data pro-
vides facts related to aircraft. The following is a list
of potential aircraft facts from the data base:
- Aircraft Bureau numbers/side numbers
- Discrepancy Facts
* Aircraft Type/Model
* Category (NMCM, NMCS , PMCM, etc.)
* Description of Malfunction
* System Affected (Work Unit Code)
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* Date of Discrepancy
* Work Center Assigned
- Last Fly Date
- Last Scheduled Maintenance Date/Flight Time
- Aircraft Configuration
2. Other Facts
In addition to aircraft-related facts, the NALCOMIS
data base contains other data that an expert system might
access. Some of these are listed below:
- GSE
* Type of Equipment
* Amount of Equipment
- IMRL/PME
* Type of Tools/Test Equipment
* Amount Available
C. KNOWLEDGE BASE
The knowledge base for this domain consists of additional
facts not contained in the NALCOMIS data base plus the
heuristics used in determining priorities.
1. Facts
Many facts not available from the data base are
necessary to express the expert knowledge in this domain.
For example, a file of the parts received for outstanding
discrepancies is needed. This information is used when
considering the priority given to jobs for which parts have
been received.
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A listing of the precedence given to PMC discrepan-
cies and their weighting should be resident in the knowledge
base. The discrepancy on the IFF taking priority over
one a seldom used FM radio was an example of this given in
Chapter III. An additional fact not in the present data
base is the amount of hangar space available. This infor-
mation is necessary so the system considers this constraint
and doesn't exceed the limitation.
There is a need to quantify the other constraints
covered in Chapter III in the knowledge base. One consider-
ation is to specify any special tools or equipment that are
required when a discrepancy is put into work. It might be
best to include this type of information with that initially
captured when the discrepancy information is originally
entered into the data base. The expert system considers
this information to ensure any required special equipment
is available prior to a discrepancy being assigned. For
example, once all the special tools of a particular type
are assigned to jobs to be put in work, another discrepancy
needing such a tool would not be assigned or considered for
assignment until the expected completion time of one of the
previously assigned jobs.
One of the key factors in prioritizing jobs is
considering the expected total elapsed repair time for the
discrepancy. These figures are presently nonexistent for
the different aircraft or systems. This information is
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determined primarily from experience gained over a period
of time from similar problems associated with a specific
system and model of aircraft.
When a discrepancy is first received, the MCO/MCC
attempts to form an intuitive estimate of what the cause of
the problem is and the time necessary to repair it. The
normal process considers each of the possible failure com-
ponents, an estimate of the probability of each component
being the cause, and the estimated elapsed repair time for
each possibility. As previously mentioned, the time for
any special inspections or check flights required for the
repair are also factored into the computation of the over-
all expected elapsed time for repair.
Portions of this problem lend themselves to possible
solution using algorithmic programming methods. Neverthe-
less, such methods need to know the estimated repair time
for each component, as well as the probability of the
component's being the cause of the system problem. This
information is not currently published or available.
One possible source for this information is the
Naval Aviation Logistics Data Analysis (NALDA) System.
NALDA is an operational automated information system. Its
primary mission is to provide information to support the
Naval Aviation logistics community. It is the central data
base repository for aviation logistical data.
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NALDA has a data base for each type aircraft by
model. To understand this organization better, it is
worthwhile to briefly explain aircraft type and model.
Examples of aircraft type are A-4 or CH-4 6 aircraft. The
model is a one letter character which further delineates a
type of aircraft into a subseries of production aircraft.
Different model aircraft of the same type may be quite
different, e.g., they may have different engines, different
radios or navigation equipment, or different weapon systems.
A CH-46D has a number of significant differences from a
CH-46E.
Inquiry was made into the possibility and difficulty
of extracting weighted probabilities for the rate of failure
for each component in a system. It was also asked if it
was possible to determine an average elapsed repair time
for each major component or the repairable subassemblies of
a given system. [Ref. 33]
NALDA' s data base is ideally organized for our
purposes, since we want to query the system for the histori-
cal background on a part as used in a particular type and
model aircraft, and not its history of use on all types of
aircraft. Response to the qeujstions in the previous para-
graph indicated that the required estimated elapsed repair
time and weighted failure rates of components within a system
can be determined from the NALDA data base.
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2 . Heuristics
The other part of the knowledge base is the heuristics
or rules section. The term "rules" is used as a general
term throughout this section, as there are several methods
of representing knowledge, as previously discussed. It
should be recalled from Chapter II that "frames" are
another representation. From the ISIS example presented
earlier and writings on planning, frames appear to be a
preferred representation scheme for this category of knowledge-
based systems.
The rules of a knowledge base use the facts of the
knowledge base as the basis for making decisions. It is
the inference engine of the system that decides how to apply
the rules and in what order.
Many of the general rules that the MCO/MCC use to
determine their priorities were generally stated in Chapter
III. These rules were captured from the initial interviews
with the maintenance experts, and it should be stressed,
only represent a surface level of knowledge of this domain.
It is beyond both the scope of this research, as
well as the implementation stage of development that the
research represents, to attempt to establish even a small
number of the specific rules that apply to this problem
domain. Rather, general rules may be used as a starting
point from which to explore the more complex interrelationships
that exist and from which further research may proceed.
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Figure 5.1 lists general rules that would form the bedrock
of the knowledge base. These rules are taken from the
heuristics stated in the interviews and presented in Chapter
III. Rules that represent knowledge of the problem domain
but are not recommended for inclusion in the knowledge base
(explained in Sections C. and D. that follow) are not
listed.
D. KNOWLEDGE FROM USER QUERY
Some facts are too dynamic to attempt to keep updated
in the knowledge base. The system should get this informa-
tion by querying the user just prior to running the system.
Two good examples of this kind of information are the air-
craft assigned to fly (and therefore not available to be
worked on) or the number of aircraft currently in the hangar.
The system needs to consider this information. User query
seems the most accurate and efficient way to provide it.
There may be other factual information the system needs
from time to time to clarify a point or to continue process-
ing. User query is a method of providing this information
so that an accurate final output is provided. Nevertheless,
consideration must be given to minimizing this method for
critical information items. Nonessential queries not only
drastically increase the system utilization time but also
demand valuable time from the decision maker.
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IF: A/C is NMCM, and
OERT < six hours
THEN: Downing DISCRP = High
IF: A/C is NMCM, and
Last fly date is > 45 days (i.e., nearing SPINTAC;
THEN: Downing D1SCRP = High
IF: A/C is NMCM, and
A/C is a "flyer", and
OEKT is < IB hours
THEN: Downing DISCRP = High
IF: A/C is NMCM, and
DISCR is high time component change
THEN: Downing DISCRP = Medium High
IF: A/C is NMCM, and
OERT > six hours
THEN: Downing DISCRP = medium high
IF: A/C is PMCM, and
PMC code = High (/med turn/ low)







A/C is FMC, and
status changes from AWP to AWM
DISCRP = Medium
A/C is FMC, and








AWM = awaiting ma int.
DISCR = discrepancy
DISCRP = disc rep. priority
OERT = overall elapsed
repair time
Figure 5.1 Discrepancy Scheduling Rules
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E. KNOWLEDGE NOT CONSIDERED
There are two factors that are best not incorporated
into the knowledge base, although they are considered in
making a final decision on what work to assign. These fac-
tors are personnel and common sense maintenance knowledge.
1. Personnel
Regarding personnel, there are two primary considera-
tions that are used in deciding what and how much work to
assign. The number of personnel available to work varies
considerably throughout a day. Because this is such a
dynamic factor it should not be factored into the expert
system for consideration. There are any number of reasons
for personnel fluctuation. Some personnel may be sick and
not present. Others may have a medical or other type of
appointment which requires their absence; still others may
be assigned to a working party. Some are on leave or tem-
porary additional duty assignment.
Another limitation is associated with the technical
proficiency of the personnel. This may be a cumulative
estimate that the MCO/MCC considers as a general guideline
in assigning the amount of work to a work center as well
as the ability of the personnel to meet expected elapsed
repair times. It may also take the form of direct communi-
cations feedback from a work center supervisor stating that
the mechanic with the real technical expertise is not present
and recommending a job be delayed.
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2 . Common Sense Maintenance Knowledge
This subject was briefly touched on in Chapter III
under the topic "Type of Discrepancy." It refers to the
very broad spectrum of general knowledge about aircraft
maintenance. It is this kind of knowledge which states
that a hydraulics repair cannot be performed at the same
time as an avionics discrepancy. The fact that a radio is
an electrical component and requires electrical power to
check the system is common sense knowledge. We cannot
efficiently hope to capture and represent all of this type
of knowledge. The order in which the components of a system
are assembled is another example of common sense knowledge.
Because of the vast amount of this knowledge, there is no
effective way of incorporating it into the knowledge base.
Supporting the recommendation that the above two
knowledge areas be excluded initially from the knowledge
base is the fact that most developed expert systems have
not attempted to capture all the knowledge of a particular
domain. The reason for this is because the state of the
technology is not sufficiently advanced to do this. Sys-
tems that have performed well have taken rather restricted
tasks and applied only the key knowledge of the domain. The
items stressed in Chapter II are very applicable to these
issues
.
Furthermore, a MCO/MCC that is given a priority work
schedule produced by an expert system can quickly factor
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in any modifications that are necessary because of consider-
ations in these areas. For instance, given a list that
included both the hydraulic and avionic discrepancies men-
tioned earlier, with both at the same priority level, the
MCO could quickly spot the conflict and ensure only one
of the discrepancies was assigned. An initial system in
this domain should not necessarily try to encompass 100
percent of the domain knowledge.
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VI. FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
This chapter presents an analysis of the thesis research.
It addresses the three major issues posed during the course
of the investigation: Are expert systems applicable for
the aircraft maintenance scheduling problem domain? Can
NALCOMIS provide the technological support for an expert
system? Is development of an expert system warranted?
A. EXPERT SYSTEM APPLICABILITY TO MAINTENANCE SCHEDULING
This section examines the suitability of an expert
system for the aircraft discrepancy planning process. The
benefits of using a knowledge-based system are considered
as well as the drawbacks related to developing such a system.
1. Suitability of the Problem. Domain
An expert system can be developed and would prove
worthwhile for aiding the maintenance control scheduling
problem. There are several sources which provide items to
consider when evaluating whether an expert systems approach
is appropriate for a given problem [Ref. 10:pp. 127-134;
Ref. 14:p. 160; Ref. 2:p. 198]. The following points covered
in these sources are directly relevant to the maintenance
control problem domain.
Do experts exist? The research conducted here
clearly indicates there are people in the field that are
generally acknowledged as having a degree of knowledge
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significantly higher than othersj. They are noted not only
for their decision making ability and knowledge in the
planning domain, but also in the other areas of responsi-
bility associated with maintenance control. The interviews
indicate that these experts are able to articulate the
methods they use and generally agree on the process and
heuristics used in making a decision.
Does the problem require common sense? AI programming
techniques are unable to represent common sense knowledge
very well [Ref. 10:p. 129]. By restricting the size and
complexity of the problem domain, as recommended in Chapter
V, the present task does not include common sense. Cogni-
tive, not physical, skills are necessary.
Is the task too simple or too difficult for an expert
system to solve? "Too simple" a task is one classified as
requiring the expert but a few minutes; "too difficult" a
problem needs from a few days to a month to solve [Ref. 10:
p. 128] . A task that requires from thirty minutes to several
hours to be resolved is acceptable for today's developmental
capabilities. This problem falls within this guideline,
taking from thirty minutes to an hour.
Other factors point to this problem domain as
acceptable for expert system solution. The potential
improvement in operational readiness is a substantial pay-
off. This type of expertise is also required in all aviation
units, not just a few. Waterman cites expert systems as
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being justified in situations where expertise is lost
through personnel changes.
Retirement, job transfer, and military duty reassignment
often cause disruption and even havoc because of the
vital expertise that experienced personnel take with
them when they leave. The institutional memory aspect
of an expert system can minimize or even eliminate this
problem. [Ref. 10:p. 131]
After analysis, it is evident that this problem is
heuristic in nature. Rules of thumb are used extensively
to reach a solution. These rules are identifiable and
therefore facilitate building a knowledge base. Although
parts of the problem domain may lend themselves to solutions
by conventional programming techniques, the problem as a
whole does not. It is too dynamic and complex. These
factors all favor an expert systems approach as being a
viable solution to the problem at hand.
•
The knowledge in this problem is symbolic rather
than numerical. It is subjective, judgmental, and changing.
These knowledge characteristics all point to artificial
intelligence (AI) techniques rather than algorithmic
solutions.
2 . Benefits from Developing an Expert System
Development of an expert system for this problem
domain would provide several benefits for the users. Such
a decision aid augments the human capability and productivity
in maintenance control. It allows the expertise from many
human experts to be combined into a shared knowledge base.
This rare and costly expertise, acquired after years of
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experience, may then be widely disseminated. In developing
such a system, the knowledge is formalized and clarified.
There are several composite squadrons in the Navy
and Marine Corps. These units have several type of aircraft
assigned to them. Such squadrons could significantly bene-
fit from a system which is able to apply expertise about each
type aircraft to the scheduling problem.
Development expenses would be minimized because of
the wide distribution of the system. Changes would not be
extensive for systems supporting another type of aircraft.
Many of the heuristics would be the same; many of the facts
would already be resident in the NALCOMIS data base. Today's
aircraft are frequently kept fifteen to twenty years. Only
gradual changes would be necessary to an expert system as
modifications were made to the aircraft. A knowledge-based
system also produces more consistent and reproducible results
than does a human expert.
Finally, such a decision support aid would allow
the MCO/MCC to concentrate more time on other pressing
problems. These potential benefits are very significant
when one considers that the maintenance field is already
limited by personnel and material constraints. It is unlikely
manpower in a squadron will be increased or that more parts
will be available. Development of an expert system offers
one of the few methods for potentially achieving significant
gains in aircraft operational readiness under the existing
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constraints. Even a small gain of as little as 2 percent,
when applied across the entire naval aircraft inventory,
translates into an additional one hundred operationally
ready aircraft each day.
3 . Drawbacks
Development of an expert system for this problem
is not without some drawbacks. Expert systems are expensive
to develop. Although the operating hardware is already
available, some expense may be incurred for possible modifi-
cations in the areas of memory expansion, mass storage
capability, or the addition of another compiler. Develop-
ment of an operational system could take as much as four to
five man years of effort before system performance is
reliable [Ref. 34:p. 39].
Because of the lack of AI compilers for NALCOMIS
hardware, the developed system would require translation
into a high level language for which a compiler is available.
While this provides wide transportability of software, it
does restrict the ability of local modification of the pro-
grams. It should also be mentioned that some risk is
obviously involved in developing leading edge software.
The discussion on planning and scheduling in Chapter V
makes this evident.
B. NALCOMIS CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT AN EXPERT SYSTEM
The literature in the knowledge engineering field
provides little information on hardware and system requirements
111
for running an expert system. Discussions do state that
development of such systems is done using AI workstations
which provide a symbolic language development environment.
It is also pointed out that programs developed in LISP or
PROLOG are frequently translated into a higher level language
for use on available user systems. Nevertheless, when it
comes to providing operational requirements for expert sys-
tems nothing specific could be found.
A phone interview with Dr. Nelson Marquina, a knowledge
engineer with Honeywell Systems and Research Center,
proved most enlighteneing. The basic problem area and
the NALCOMIS hardware were described to him. Estimates of
from 1000 to 2000 rules for the knowledge base were assumed.
It was also assumed that from 100 to 200 discrepancies were
outstanding and that no other demands would be simultaneously
made on the system.
Dr. Marquina was asked to estimate hardware memory require-
ments and the time to process the data and produce an output.
Stating that the figures were only rough estimates, he sug-
gested that one-half Mbyte of memory was required and from
five to ten minutes were needed to run the program. To be
on the safe side, given the impreciseness of the assumptions,
he recommended one Mbyte of memory. Dr. Marquina also stated
that these figures were based on the assumption that the
program was written in an efficient higher level language,
such as C, and that the rules were considered nontrivial.
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While these figures must be looked on as inexact, they none-
theless provide some guidelines to the requirements for
such a system.
From a hardware perspective NALCOMIS meets the basic
memory estimate of one Mbyte. There is little doubt that
additional mass storage capability, in the form of additional
Winchester disks, would be necessary. NALCOMIS at the OMA
level is capable of being expanded in this area.
NALCOMIS presently uses COBOL as its higher level pro-
gramming language. Both a literature search and numerous
interviews with people working in the knowledge engineering
field failed to find one application where COBOL had been
used as a translation language for an expert system originally
developed using a symbolic language. If an expert system
were to be developed for NALCOMIS a high level language com-
piler other than COBOL would have to be used to run the
expert system. There is a capability to add a different
compiler to the DPS 6 system.
Another aspect to consider for improving the efficiency
of an expert system is the use of on-call procedures which
are more effective at compiling some aspects of a problem
than symbolic programs. Algorithmic programming techniques
for determining the expected elapsed work hours is an exam-
ple of a situation where this could prove beneficial.
A final question arises. Can NALCOMIS afford to lockout
its basic functions as an MIS for two or three ten minute
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periods required to run the expert system in the course of
a day? There is no other dedicated machine to download
NALCOMIS data on. The initial run in the morning, before
most work centers are using the system, does not present a
problem. It is also reasonable to believe that the NALCOMIS
system would not be adversely effected by the other expert
system runs. Although NALCOMIS provides real time access
to the data base, this information is seldom so critical
to any maintenance function that it must be instantly
available. Should an exceptional reason arise that necessi-
tates instant access, the expert system run could be aborted
and run later.
In summary, NALCOMIS is likely to support an expert
system with only slight modifications to the present system's
architecture. Minimal degradation of the functions provided
by the MIS may result.
C. IS DEVELOPMENT OF AN EXPERT SYSTEM JUSTIFIED?
An expert system does provide a service for which a
need really exists. This need is for more effective deci-
sions to be made when scheduling maintenance. One might ask
are all maintenance control work centers equally capable?
The overwhelming opinion of professionals is no, they are
not. A key factor determining the quality of this work
center is the ability of the MCO and MCC to make effective
decisions. This ability varies. There are some however,
who are clearly considered "experts." The decisions the
114
MCO and MCC make in planning the work schedule will have
a significant impact on resulting aircraft operational readi-
ness. Any decision support tool for this area can provide
valuable assistance.
Chapter III covered several negative aspects of the
decision environment in maintenance control. These factors
would have little effect on an expert system. Use of the
expert system would also nullify much of the lost expertise
caused by the turnover of key personnel inherent with the
military profession.
Can the human decision maker in maintenance control,
assimilate, and synthesize all the information available?
Studies by cognitive scientists have shown that human memory
consists of clusters of symbols called "chunks." Chunks
are hierarchically organized collections of symbols. Re-
search has concluded that a human can only maintain and
process from four to seven chunks in short-term memory at
one time [Ref. 2:p. 24]. Vast amounts of facts and rules
must be taken into consideration when scheduling. There is
good reason to believe there is more information available
than can be comprehended and compiled by the average main-
tenance controller in making a decision. An expert system
can use and process all the available information and there-
fore make a more knowledgeable decision.
The NALCOMIS project was approved over eight years ago.
At that time it proposed a state of the art MIS. Today's
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prototype gives every indication that it does an excellent
job of meeting its objectives. Nevertheless, since
NALCOMIS's inception new technologies have entered the work
place; first in the form of decision support systems and
followed by today's expert systems. As late as 19 80 the
majority of expert systems were still in the research labs
[Ref. 2:p. 1] . Today many systems, and the tools for build-
ing these systems, are being rapidly developed. It is
very likely that NALCOMIS has the technological capability
to support this state of the art technology. Moreover,
much of the knowledge required for the knowledge base is
already resident in the present data base. It seems only
logical to use both the hardware and data assets to their
fullest. Further development of potential uses for NALCOMIS
should not stagnate while prototyping continues. Research
on new and innovative technological applications should
simultaneously be pursued.
There are two other indirect benefits of developing an
expert system for this problem domain. First, further
investigation of the problem will undoubtedly provide
valuable insight and greater understanding of the scheduling
process itself. Weiss and Kulikowski state that from a
scientific point of view, the most important reason for
building an expert system is the formalization and clarifi-
cation of knowledge that results from having the human
expert make his reasoning explicit [Ref. l:p. 7].
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A second important benefit is the introduction of AI
technology in the military at a very visible but noncrucial
level. There currently exists considerable resistance on
the part of military users, and in society as a whole, to
accept any technology with the AI label. MYCIN has been
proven to be as capable as experts in the medical profession
at diagnosing infectious blood diseases. However, it
has never been widely accepted or used by the medical
profession.
This same resistance exists for military applications
of AI . Users will not freely accept the introduction of such
systems into critical life and death or tactical applications.
Pilots will be unwilling to turn over to a computer the
flying of the aircraft in a crisis situation. Naval officers
will likewise be hesitant to trust the defense of the ship,
including weapons response, to a computer. Current levels
of resistance not only delay research funding in these
areas, they often lead to scrapping of projects altogether.
It is contended that for more technically advanced AI systems
to gain acceptance, practical non-critical AI systems must
first be introduced to the users. As users gain familiarity
and confidence in the more general and small applications,
they will be more willing to accept and pursue techno-
logically advanced projects. An expert system applied to
the maintenance scheduling problem seems to be just the
right type of project. It deals with a nontrivial and
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complex decision process and would expose numerous personnel
to AI technology.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The scheduling decisions made in maintenance control
are crucial to the aircraft operational readiness of a
squadron. These decisions are currently made using the
techniques developed and used twenty years ago. While
these techniques are functionally sound, they do not pro-
vide the capability to fully use all available information
in determining a decision. The decision environment is
simply too demanding and complex to do so.
The development of an expert system for prioritizing
aircraft discrepancies to be worked on is both feasible
from a technological standpoint and desirable because of
the improved decision support it would provide. The prob-
lem domain is suitable for expert system development. There
are "experts" in the field. The task is sufficiently com-
plex and difficult for expert system application. The
planning problem is generally heuristic in nature and re-
quires symbolic rather than numerical solution.
Development of such a system would improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of the scheduling decisions made in main-
tenance control. Improved operational readiness is a direct
result. It allows available information to be used more
fully in the decision process. The expertise of several
experts is combined in a shared knowledge base. Such a system
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also minimizes the negative effects caused by the loss of
expertise resulting from the frequent personnel reassignments
inherent with military service. It provides aircraft his-
torical knowledge to the MCO/MCC transferred to a new aircraft
type. An expert system could be widely distributed through-
out Naval aviation with only aircraft specific knowledge
changing.
While no definitive answer can be given as to the capa-
bility of NALCOMIS to support such a system, there are
several favorable indicators that suggest that it could.
The expandability of NALCOMIS hardware and peripherals can
provide both the necessary memory and mass storage require-
ments an expert system requires. Although the present
COBOL-based software is not acceptable for expert system
implementation, there are other suitable compilers available
and compatible with the DPS6/54 system.
There are two negative factors which need to be considered.
The costs and time to develop an expert system for this
problem domain are not trivial. The potential improvement
in operational readiness, however, more than offsets these
factors. The implementation of an expert system with
NALCOMIS would likely require the lockout of normal system
functions for short periods two or three times per day.
The information provided by NALCOMIS is not of such a
critical nature that these few delays are not acceptable.
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Development of an expert system for aircraft discrepancy
scheduling has many potential benefits. It provides state
of the art decision support for the user. It allows a
greater use of the data available from NALCOMIS. The poten-
tial for improved aircraft readiness is substantial. It
permits the introduction and wide visibility of AI technology
at a practical level, setting the groundwork for more
critical AI applications in the future. Further research in
this area is warranted.
During the course of this research, several areas were
examined and related recommendations are in order. The
potential application of a knowledge-based system to the
maintenance control scheduling domain should be more
thoroughly investigated by knowledge engineering professionals
Other areas that offer benefits for effective maintenance
decision making should be explored. Operations research
tools are one possible source. System component failure
rates and elapsed repair times, as discussed in Chapter V,
should be extracted from NALDA or other aviation data bases
and made available to maintenance decision makers.
Other possible uses of the data and hardware assets
provided by NALCOMIS should be explored. Many new software
productivity and decision making aids have been developed
since the original inception and design of the system several
years ago. Although the OMA portion of this program is
still in the prototype development stage, other possible
applications should be considered.
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Writings on the acquisition and coding of knowledge
and on the implementation requirements of a knowledge-
based system need to be published. There is a considerable
amount of literature on expert systems scattered in books,
technical reports, conference proceedings, etc. Unfor-
tunately for one considering the potential implementation
of an expert system, they are either written at a theoretical
or at a general informative level. Practical writings on
the acquisition, formalization, and coding of knowledge for
expert systems are necessary. Technical information on the
hardware and software requirements for implementing expert
systems is virtually nonexistent. Information in this area
is needed.
Based on the previous discussion, it is submitted that
development of an expert system for scheduling discrepancies
is both feasible and appropriate. It should be emphasized
that such a system would serve as a decision support tool
and not as a replacement for the MCO/MCC ' s decision making
for this domain. The improved management effectiveness
and potential for improved aircraft operational readiness
that an expert system offers are well worth the costs.
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